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"DON'T TREAD ON THE ADA":t
OLMSTEAD V L.C. EX REL. ZIMRING AND
THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY
INTEGRATION FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH
MENTAL DISABILITIES
Persons [with mental disabilities who are institutionalized] . .
suffer not only a dramatic loss of physical freedom with . . . severely
detailed control and invasive treatment, they also cannot enjoy
those mundane, daily pleasures—working, shopping, enjoying the
companionship of family and friends, or simply being left alone—
the loss of which we on the outside would find to be not only
intolerable but a. threat to our troy sanity.'
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA") with the clear intention of eliminating the unnecessary seg-
regation and isolation of individuals with disabilities in institutions. 2
Although progress has been made, after nine years, the goal of inte-
grating persons with disabilities" - into the community has yet to he
realized.4 Many states currently have long waiting lists of individuals
t TAsH, "Don't 'Read On The ADA': Integration nal segregation! (visited Feb. 16, 1990)
Chttpi//wsvw.tash.org/actionaleris/oltastead.html >.
'Wyatt v. King, 773 F. Stipp. 1508, 1512 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(2) (1994) ("historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem"); 42
U.S•C. § 12101(a) (5) ("individuals with disabilities continually encounter raviolis halos of dis-
crimination, including outright intentional exclusion segregation, and relegation to lesser
services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities"); 42 U.S.C. 12101(6) (1)
("lilt is the purpose of this chapter to !amide a clear and comprehensive natioind mandate for
the elimbtation of discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
3 •he ADA applies to all persons with disabilities, while die Supreme Cottres ruling in
Olmstead referred specifically u, individuals with mental disabilities. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 1210i (a) (1)—(b) (4), with 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2181, 2185, 2190 (1099). Consequently, although this
Note focuses on individuals with mental disabilities, it uses the more general terms "individuals
with disabilities" or "persons with disabilities" when the context requires reference to both those
with mental and those with physical disabilities.
'1 See, e.g.. Sharon Davis, People in State Institutions Waiting for Comrm t nity Plarentent, in TI1E
ARC: A Srxrus REPORT '1 -0 THE NATION ON PEOPLE WITI1 MENTAL RETARDATION WAITINO FOR
CommuNrrr SERVICLS app. (1097), relninted at The ARC, 1Vaiting Slats (visited Mar. 20, 1990)
Clittp://thearc.org/report/Waid'age.lunil > [hereinafter Davis, Tire ARC: A Status Report]; see
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with disabilities for whom qualified professionals have recommended
community placement, but who remain confined to institutions, where
they lose their independence, sense of competence and feelings of
self-worth and dignity." In contrast, life at home or in a community-
based group setting provides the opportunity for autonomy, privacy
and freedom to associate with and form meaningful relationships with
whomever one chooses.'
The controversy regarding the integration of individuals with dis-
abilities into the community centers on the language of the ADA and
the implementing regulations of the Department ofJustice.? Title II of
the ADA states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." The
Department of Justice regulations that implement this anti-discrimina-
tion clause mandate that "(a] public entity shall administer services,
programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities."° The "most integrated
setting appropriate" for such individuals is often the home or the
community as opposed to an institution." At the same time, the De-
partment ofJustice regulations further state that "[a] public entity shall
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures .. .
unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activ-
ity
The issue entered a new phase when, on Julie 22, 1999, in Olm-
stead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring ("Olmstead"), the United States Supreme
Court held that the unjustified segregation of individuals with mental
aisoAinici Curiae Brief of ADAPT, National Council on Independent Living, and TASI4 in support
of Respondents at **10-11, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Ziniting, 119 S. Ct, 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536)
thereinafter Brief of ADAPT].
5 See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae American Association on Mental Retardation in Support of
Respondents at *15, ObIlliPlid (No. 98-536) I hereinafter Brief for Am. Assoc, on Mental Retar-
dation]; Dana M. Besseue, Note, Reinterpreting the ADA: Finding a Freedom flora] Unnecessary
Segregation, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRINI. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 131, 171 (1998).
6 See, e.g., Brief for Am. Assoc. un Mental Retardation, supra note 5, at **14-15.
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b) (7), (d) (1998).
8 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
9 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (emphasis added).
ID See I a A. Burnitn. The ADXs Integration tilandate" Should Promote Coumninity Services,
Opening Remarks Before the United States C.onimission on Civil Rights (Nov. 13. 1988), available
al The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Line, Ira Burnam Testimony of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights (visited Feb. 16, 1999) Clittp://www.bazelon.org/ibtest.huul >.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(1_)(7) (emphasis added).
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disabilities 12 in institutions constitutes discrimination under the ADA. 13
The Court also held that the ADA requires states to provide community
placement given the satisfaction of the following conditions: (1) the
state's treatment professionals determine that such placement is ap-
propriate; (2) the "affected individual" does not oppose the place-
ment; and (3) the state can reasonably accommodate the placement
without fundamentally altering its program, given the state's available
resources and the needs of other individuals with mental disabilities."
The Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead has far-reaching impli-
cations for the right of persons with mental disabilities to receive
treatment in the most integrated setting appropriate.' 5 Although the
Court's ruling referred to individuals with mental disabilities, the rul-
ing will have an impact on those with physical disabilities as well.'' This
Note argues that it is highly significant that in the first part of its ruling,
the Court made the .powerful statement that the unjustified segrega-
tion of individuals with mental disabilities in institutions constitutes
discrimination under the ADA.' 7 At the same time, however, it is dis-
appointing that in the second part of its ruling, the Court conditioned
the right of individuals with mental disabilities to live in the most
integrated setting appropriate on a broader interpretation of the rea-
sonable-modifications regulation.'" This Note urges future lower courts
to follow the principle set by the Supreme Court in the first part of its
ruling and to hold states to a stringent standard when evaluating a
fundamental alteration defense.' 9 Finally, this Note also recommends
that Congress should take the initiative and enact new legislation that
12 it is important to note that the Supreme Court in its opinion in Olmstead used the term
"indiAduals with mental disabilities" and tlid not distinguish between those with developmental
disabilities and those with mental illness. See 119 S. Ct. at 2181, 2185, 2190. Because the Court
did not differentiate between these two groups, this Note generally does not make such a
distinction, unless specifically indicated. A full discussion the differences between these two
groups of individuals as well as the varying implications of the Court's decision for the two groups
is beyond the scope of this Note.
"See id. at 2185.
14 See id. at 2181, 2100.
Lr' See id. at 2181, 2185, 2190. Expressing the emotional intensity of this case, one disability
rights group asked: "Will Obusind be our Barron a Board of Education . . . lob-, will Olmstead be
our bred Scott?" See ADAPT, Bulletins and Upcoming Events (visited Feb. 16, 1999)
Chttp://www.adapt.otg/bulletill.ht III>.
16 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181, 2185, 2190.
17 See id. at 2185; see also infra notes 258-71 and accompanying text.
18 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188-90: See also infla notes 319-88 and accompanying text.
° See Olmstead, 119 S. Ci. at 2181, 2185, 2190; see also infra notes 389-93 and accompanying
text.
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would create a mechanism to encourage and ultimately enable states
to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate.°
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the institutionalization
of individuals with mental disabilities in the United States, including
the gradual recognition of the importance of community ,
 integration. 21
Part II provides a brief explanation of the Medicaid system, the mecha-
nism by which states fund home and community-based care for their
citizens with disabilities.22 Part II also explores recent attempts to trans-
form Medicaid into a more community-based system.° Part III details
early legislative efforts to combat discrimination against individuals
with disabilities that set the stage for the ADA. 24 Part IV examines
relevant portions of the ADA and case law regarding the issue of
community integration in the years leading up to Olmstead. 25 Part V
discusses the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Olmstead. 26 Part
VI analyzes the opinion of the Court and provides suggestions for the
future."
I. HISTORY OF THE SEGREGATION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH
MENTAL DISABILITIES IN INSTITUTIONS AND THE
EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY INTEGRATION
The segregation of individuals with mental disabilities in institu-
tions apart from the rest of society has been a critical facet of the lives
of such individuals in the United States &II- more than a hundred
years. 28
 In 1848, Massachusetts established the first public facility for
persons with mental retardation, the present-day Fernald State School
in Waltham.° This facility, like other early institutions for individuals
with mental disabilities resembled a school, providing short-term train-
ing for young people to enable them to return to the community."
20 See infra notes 400-26 and acct . )! lipanying text.
21 See infra notes 28-59 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 60-82 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 100-52 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 153-229 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 230-57 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 258-426 and accompanying text.
28 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living CAL, 473 U .S. 432,461-62 (1985) (Nlarsliall, J.„
dissenting).
2g See Samuel Gridley Howe, Tenth Anniversary Report of the JlfassachumIts School for
and Feeble-Minded Muth 11 (1857) (on file with the Samuel Gridley Howe Library, Fernald State
School, Nlassachusetts).
30 See id.
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In the 1880s, however, the institutions began to change from this
early model of a school to that of an asylum providing long-term
custodial tare)" Several factors led to this development, including the
admission of younger individuals with severe disabilities and the admis-
sion of older persons." Moreover, during these years, medical and
academic professionals prOmoted the view that individuals with mental
disabilities were likely to engage in criminal activities and sexually
immoral behavior and were therefore a menace to society." Because
of the perceived danger these individuals posed,. the professionals
further argued that they should be locked up and segregated from the
rest of the community. 34 Institutionalization thus calve to be viewed as
an effective solution, providing individuals with mental disabilities the
paternalistic protection they needed and, at the same time, safeguard-
ing the community at large."
Toward the end of the Nineteenth and beginning of the Twentieth
Century, the United States experienced a rapid economic and social
transformation from a predominantly rural to an increasingly urban
and industrialized society." Nationalist sentiment grew, and with it
grew xenophobia caused by the large number of immigrants who had
settled in this country. 37 Paralleling this fear was a distrust of anyone
viewed as different, including individuals with mental disabilities." The
superintendents of the large institutions and state legislatures used
harsh rhetoric to describe these individuals." For example, in 1918,
the Georgia State Legislature created a "Commission on the Feeble-
Minded" to help "relieve the State of the menace of the uncared-for
feeble-minded who are such a fertile source of crime, poverty, prosti-
tution and misery . . . ."4" Furthermore, the pseudo-scientific and pop-
ular eugenics movement, which advocated principles of selective
31 See R.C. Se.11E.ERENBERGER, A FlisTokv OF M ENTAL RETARDATION 123 (1983).
32 See id. at 124-25.
33 See Walter E. Fernald, The Imbecile with Criminal Instincts, Paper Presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Medico-Psychological Association, Cincinnati, Ohio (1908), wprinted in
JAmEs W. TRENT, INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A IllisTotiv OF MENTAL RVIARDATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 160-61 (1904),
"'See Martin W. Barr, The Imperative Call of Our Anent to Our Future, 7 Psycato-AsTiIENICS
5-8 (1902), relminted in • lit 	 supra note 33, at 142-43.
" See TRENT, supra note 33, at 189.
III See SCUIEERENIIERGER, supra note 31, al 137-38.
37 SeeTimothy M. Cook, The Arnnicans with Disabilities Act: The Marie to Integration, 64 Tim, .
L. Rm.. 393,400 (1991).
38 See id.
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at *2, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zintring, 119 S.Ci. 2176 (1999)
(No. 98-536).
4 ° Id, (citation oniiiteil).
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breeding to purify the human species, called for the sterilization and
segregation of individuals with mental disabilities to prevent them from
passing on their "defective" genes to future generations:" Although
the influence of the eugenics movement slowly declined in the years
following World War I, sterilization continued as a practice at institu-
tions for many years. 42 From 1937 to 1970, for example, Georgia al-
lowed superintendents of institutions to recommend sterilization for
residents who were "likely . . to procreate a child." 43
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, disability rights advocates, who
gained momentum from the civil rights movement, became an increas-
ingly vocal group:" One of the major goals of these disability rights
advocates was to help individuals _leave the institutions in which they
had long been confined:* Additionally, sociological studies exposed
the abuse and neglect occurring in institutions and thereby contrib-
uted to the impetus for change:* "Deinstitutionalization"—the dis-
charge of individuals from institutions and their subsequent care in
the community—thus began as a positive response to the many years
41 _See SCHEERENBERGER, supra note 31, at 152-56, 158; TRENT, supra time 33, at 213 ("['I'[ he
modern eugenics movement which is principally led by sociologists and psychologists, many of
whom have little or no insight into the pathological conditions underlyiiig many of these defects,
teaches that all, or nearly all mental defect is to be attributed to heredity or to faulty parentage
....") (quoting Charles Bernstein: 1917); see also RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DtcrtoN-
Ala 453 (2c1 ed. 1999) (defining eugenics as "a science concerned with improving a species .
by such means as influencing or encouraging reproduction by persons presumed to have desir-
able genetic traits").
12 See TRENT, supra note 33, at 190.
43 Brief for Respondents at *2, Olmstead (No-98-536) (citation omitted).
44 See Robert L. Bergdorf, jr., The Americans. with Disabilities Ark Analysis and Implications of
a Second
-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413. 427 (1991). Also in the
	 •
1970s, individuals with mental retardation I>egait to speak out for themselves and to play an
important role in organizing self-advocacy conferences. See Gunnar Dybwad, Setting the Stage
in NiE VOICES: SELF-ADVOCACY as PEOPLE WITH DtsartftrriEs 5-9 (Gunnar Dybwad
& flank Bersani, jr., eds., 1996) [hereinafter NEW NbicEsT. These groups slowly gathered support
over the next two decades. Id. at 9. In the 1090s, self-advocacy groups have become a widely-ac-
cepted and strong voice. See Michael WeInneyer & Richard Berkohien, Tlrr. Legacy of Self Advocacy:
People with Cognitive Disabilities as Leaders in their Community, in Nov VOICES 246. One of the
major goals of self-advocates is full and active participation in all aspects of community life. See
The ARC, Se/fArivocncy (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <hup://thearc.org/posits/seifadv.hunl >.
45 SeeJohn W. Parry, Mental and Physical Disability Rights: The Formative Yeats and Future
Prospects, 20 MENTAL & Pm-sic-AL DisAnn.rre L. REP. 627, 627 (1996). During this time some
disability rights advocates began to promote the philosophy of independent livingovhich rejected
"the authoritarian medical model" in favor of "a paradigm of individual empowerment and
responsibility for defining and meeting one's own needs." See Gina McDonald & Mike Oxford,
History of Independent Living (visited Jul. 6, 1999) <lutp://www,acils.com/acii/ilhistory.lintil >.
46 See Nancy K. Rhoden, Tlw Limits of Liberty: Deinstilutionalization, Homelessness, and Liber-
tar ian Theory, 31 ESIORY L.J. 375, 380-81 (1982),
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of segregation and isolation in institutions. 47 In recent years, however,
&institutionalization has developed a negative connotation, referring
to the release of large numbers of vulnerable individuals into the
streets without adequate planning and support programming." One
commentator has noted that "deinstitutionalization has become a con-
venient scapegoat for our society's current neglect of the less fortunate
and most vulnerable, whether they reside in large institutions, board-
ing homes, or on the streets."4" In response to this negative public
perception, disability advocates are urging the integration of individu-
als with disabilities into the community through the provision of ap-
propriate services and support programs. 5°
Additionally, over the past two decades, many studies have docu-
mented the benefits' associated with community integration. (" For ex-
ample, individuals residing at home or in the community attain a
greater degree of independence as well as dignity and self-worth. 52
Similarly, such individuals can actively participate in and make deci-
sions that affect their lives." Moreover, they feel a part of the commu-
nity and develop meaningful relationships with individuals who do not
have disabilities, including both family members and friends.• Persons
with disabilities living at home or in the community also engage in
simple activities that characterize the everyday lives of others living in
mainstream society, such as attending movies, participating in religious
activities, eating in restaurants and attending sporting events. 55
Research has demonstrated other advantages to community inte-
gration as well. For example, persons with disabilities who liVe at home
or in the community are more likely to develop greater competence
and better adaptive skills than individuals who live in institutional
settings.' [' Integrated educational programs enable individuals with dis-
abilities to acquire a more advanced level of skills and to obtain post-
-17 Sae Parry, supra note 45, at 627.
18 See id.; we also Ithoden, supra note 46, at 375 ("Dehimitutionalization, once hailed as an
ideal social reform, is now decried as a near disaster.").
'IS Parry, supra note 45, at 627.
5° See, e.g, COMM uni0,-Based Care for the Disabled: Hearing on II,R. 2020 Before the Subrwntn.
on Health and the !Environment, 105tH Cong. (1098) (statement of Michael Auberger, on behalf
of American Disabled for Attendant Programs Today (ADAPT)) (hereinafter Auberger State-
ment]; Bessette, supra note 5, at 143.
51 See, e.g., Bria fin - Am. Assoc. oil. Mental.Relardation, supra note 5, at "14-15; Cook, supra
note 37, at 455.
52 See Brief for Am. Assoc. on Mental Retardation, supra note 5, at * 14.
53 See Cook, supra note 37, at 455.
See Brief for Am. Assoc. on Mental Retardation, supra note 5, at *14.
55 See id.
56 See id. at "14- 15.
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education work in integrated settings, where they receive higher
wages.-'" Finally, the integration of individuals with disabilities reduces
stereotyping and enhances the perspective of individuals who do not
have disabilities. 58
 Long-term contact between persons with disabilities
and those without disabilities improves tolerance for diversity on the
part of siblings, parents and educators, as well as other members of the
general population. i9 .
H. FUNDING OF SERVICES FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES THROUGH THE MEDICAID SYSTEM
A. Brief Description of Medicaid
While community integration has clearly documented benefits,
individuals with disabilities remain confined and isolated in institutions
largely clue to financial concerns of the states.° The issue of cost,
consequently, is intricately entwined with the issue of community inte-
gration."' In 1965, with the passage of Title XIX of the Social Security
Act, Congress established Medicaid, a system of matching federal and
state funds, to provide "medical assistance on behalf of families with
dependent children and of the aged, blind, or disabled individuals
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
necessary medical services."02 Although a state's participation in the
Medicaid system is optional, if a state chooses to participate it must
comply with all federal requirements.° For example, one of the federal
requirements is that "[medical] assistance . . . be furnished with rea-
sonable promptness to all eligible individuals."' States are able to
determine the various parameters of their own programs, including
eligibility requirements, amount of payments to facilities and adminis-
trative procedures.°
57 See Cook, supra note 37, at 454.
" See id. at 448-49.
59 See id.
11° See Lucille D. Wood, Costs and the Right to Community-Based neatment, 16 YALE L. & Pot; r
REV. 501, 501 (1998).
"I Sc,' Id,
52 See 42 OW, § 1396(1) (1994 & Stipp. II 1996); see also RASH] FEIN, MEDICAL CARE,
MEDICAL COSTS: THE SEARCl/ FOR A FIF:ALTII INSURANCE POLICY 10813 (1986); IICFA, Medicaid:
A Beige SI4 ',away (visited Nov, 12, 1998) Clidp://mmlicia,goviniedicare/ormedicaid.litnt#Medi-
caid>,
63 Sea Filmes v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1993); Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Stipp. 914,
918-19 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980)).
"42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8).
°See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
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Although states have a certain degree of latitude in determining
eligibility, they must include specific groups of individuals—for exam-
ple, individuals with disabilities who receive Supplemental Security
Income ("SSI") from the federal government." In addition to the
mandatory groups, states can provide coverage for other individuals as
well. ('' The optional groups incltide: (1) institutionalized individuals
eligible according to a specific income level set by the state; (2) indi-
viduals who would be eligible if institutionalized, but who are receiving
care under home and community-based service waivers:, (3) elderly
adults or adults with disabilities who have incomes above those requir-
ing mandatory coverage but below the Federal Poverty Level ("FPL");
and (4) working individuals and persons with disabilities who have
family income less than 250% of FPL who would qualify for SSI if they
did not work."
Before 1981, Medicaid provided assistance for long-term care only
if the individual resided in an institution.09 That year, Congress at-
tempted to change the "institutional bias" of Medicaid by passing
§ 1915(c) of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, which created the
Home and Community Based Services ("HCBS") Waiver Program for
the treatment of individuals with mental retardation in the commu-
nity 7° In 1986, Congress also extended the waiver program to provide
community-based services for individuals with chronic mental illness: 71
The term "waiver" derives from the fact that the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") can choose to
waive certain requirements of Title XIX." The state is then able to
utilize a portion of its Medicaid funds, which otherwise would have
been designated for institutional use, to provide home or cominunity-
based services. 7" To obtain waivers, a state applies for a certain number
of waiver slots and guarantees that the cost of the home or commu-
86 See 42 U.S,C. § 1396a(a) (10)(A)(1)
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) ( 10) (A) (ii) (1),(XIV).
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10)(A)(ii) (IV), (VI), (X), (XIII).
69 See Sally K. Richardson, Dir., Foreword to HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION,
MEDICAID BUREAU, APPROACHES TO QUALITY UNDER HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES
WAIVERS, at iii (1993),
"See id.
7t See Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9411, 100 Stat. 1874, 2061-62 (1986). Medicaid does not cover
institutional care fur individuals with mental illness except those over 65 or miller 21. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396d (a) (xi) (14) , (16), (27) (B).
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 139611(c)(1)—(10); see also Brief For Respondents at *3 n,l, Olmstead v.
L.C. ex rel. `pinning, 119 S. Ct.. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-53(i); MASS. DMR, EICBS: YOUR GUIDE
TO THE HOME & COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES WAIVER 2 (1997).
See 42 U.S.C, § 1396n(c)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 441.300 (1998).
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nity-based services will not exceed that of institutional care. 74 The state
must also inform all eligible individuals of the -possible alternatives and
provide these individuals with the opportunity to make a choice. 75
Under the HCBS Waiver Program, states have the flexibility to
select the particular services that are most appropriate for their target
population. 76
 The waiver program allows states to choose from the
following services: "case management services, homemaker/home
health aid services and personal care services, adult day health services,
habilitation services, [and] respite care." 77 Because the waiver program
is optional and dependent on the discretion of each state, there is
currently a wide disparity, among the states with respect to the amount
of funds used for home and community-based programming. 78
 More-
over, some states do not utilize all the waiver slots for which they have
applied. 79
 For example, of the 2,106 waivers allotted to Georgia by the
Secretary of HHS in 1996, the State only used 700." Consequently,
states such as Georgia that provide limited home and community-based
services have long lists of individuals waiting to receive services in the
corn munity. 81
 Thus, the HCBS Waiver Program has not succeeded in
eradicating the institutional bias of the Medicaid system. 82
B. Recent Congressional Efforts to Reform the
Institutional Bias of Medicaid
As a result of the failure of the waiver program to provide a
sufficient number of community placements, disability advocates have
recently looked to Congress to enact additional legislation that would
encourage states to provide more home and community-based serv-
ices." In 1997, the 105th Congress saw the introduction of a bill in the
Senate and another in the House of Representatives to help change
74 See 42 U.S.C. § 139611(c) (2)(D); 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(e).
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 139611(c) (2)(G); 42 C.F.R, § 441.302(d).	 -
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (4)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 440.180.
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396t1 (c) (4) (B).
79 See, e.g., Scott S. Greenberger, Groups fight stale for Medicaid home rate: Advocates for
disabled say Texas violates federal law by paying only for rate in nursing homes, THE AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Sept. 11, 1998), reprinted at TheAustitt American-Statesman (visited Sept.
12, 1998) <lit tp://www.Austin360.con 1/news/002state/09sept/11/1 1 acialtin>.
79 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at **20-21,
Olmstead (No, 98-536) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
89 See id. at *21,
81 See Davis, The ARC: A Status Report, supra note 4,
82 See, e.g., Atiberger Statement, supra note 50.
"See Long-Term Care and Deficit Reduction Act of 1997, S. 879, 105th Cong. (1997);
Medicaid Community Attendant Services Act of 1997, 1-I.R. 2020, 105th Cong. (1997).
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the institutional bias of Medicaid and increase the proportion of indi-
viduals receiving home and community-based services. 84 Senator Fein-
gold (D-Wis.) introduced Senate Bill 879 ("S. 879") on June 11, 1997,
known as the "Long-Term Care Reform and Deficit Reduction Act of
1997."8' Former House Speaker Newt. Gingrich (R-Ga.) introduced
House Bill 2020 ("H.R. 2020"), known as the "Medicaid Community
Attendant Services Act of 1997" ("MiCASA"), on June 24, 1997, as an
amendment to Title XIX of the Social Security Act. 8°
Although the two bills differed in certain respects, each provided
for some form of financial assistance to the states to help them make
the transition to increased home and community-based services. 87 Mi-
CASA, actively promoted by American Disabled for Attendant Pro-
grams Today ("ADAPT"), a national grassroots disability rights organi-
zation, had over seventy co-sponsors, many more than S. 879, and also
received considerably more publicity. 88 For example, Christopher
Reeve gave his support to MiCASA, stating, "I think the home environ-
ment is much more psychologically conducive to health than a nursing
home environment so I would certainly support [H.R. 2020]."" At.the
end of the 105th Congress, S. 879 remained stalled in the Senate
Finance Committee, and H.R. 2020 similarly had not moved out of the
House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House
Commerce Committee. 9°
Because these earlier bills met with only limited success, members
of ADAPT are currently urging support for the "Medicaid Community
Attendant Services and Supports Act of 1999" ("MiCASSA"), which is
still in the early stages of development. 9 ' The drafters of this prospec-
84 See S. 879; H.R. 2020.
85 See S. 879..
"See H.R. 2020.
87 Str S. 879, tit. I, §§ 108-109; H.R. 2020 § 2(b) (1) (11).
88 See, e.g., Liberty Resources, Medicaid Community Attendant Services Act: There:5 no place like
home! (visited Oct. 18, 1998) Clutp://www.libertyresourees.org/inc/ca-index.html > (providing
summary of itml backgRiund for MiCASA, noting "ADAPT are the foot soldiers of the MiCASA
Movement.").
89 See Liberty Resources. Christopher Reeve Connects with Disabled on Radio: Supports Key
"MiCASA" Legislation; Improving Disabled Image in Movies (visited Oct. 18, 1998) Cluip://on-
arollradio.com/CRelease.html >.
90 SeeTtiCIMAS, Legislative Information on the Internet, 1301 Summary & Status for the 105th
Congress: S. 879 (visited July 3, 1999) <Imp://thomas,10e.goviegi-bin/Iniquery/z?d105:
SN00879:00C>; TnumAs, Legislative Information on the Internet, Bill Summary & Status for
the 105th Congress: LIM 2020 (visited July 3, 1999) Clutp://thontas.loc.gov/cgi-hin/bdquery/
z?d1051114.02020;e@C>.
91 See Memorandum front ADAPT to MiCASSA Supporters, at i (Feb. 1, 1999) (providing text
of prospective MiCASSA hill) (on tile with author) hereinafter MiCASSA].
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tive bill changed the name to MiCASSA in order to add the word
"Supports," signifying the inclusion of cognitive assistance.92
 MiCASSA
describes in greater detail the kinds of services states should provide
and adds a section on findings and purposes." For example, the pro-
spective bill states in its findings that "[t] here is a growing recognition
that disability is a natural part of the human experience that in no way
diminishes a person's right to: live independently; enjoy self-determi-
nation; make choices; contribute to society; and enjoy full inclusion
and integration in the mainstream of American society."94 The major
purpose of MiCASSA is to provide federal funding to encourage states
to make systemic changes in their provision of services to individuals
with disabilities. 95 Under MiCASSA, states can utilize the federal finan-
cial assistance in a variety of ways—for example, to conduct a needs
assessment of individuals with disabilities within their state, implement
strategies to change the institutional bias of their services, help with
institutional overhead costs or provide training - for professionals or
para-professionals. 96 MiCASSA also aims to enable individuals with dis-
abilities to make an informed choice with respect to high- quality
services in the most integrated setting appropriate. 97 Furthermore, the
prospective bill encourages the development of quality-assurance state
plans and suggests methods to monitor state compliance with such
plans." Members of ADAPT are currently promoting MiCASSA and
are hoping to obtain a sponsor in the 106th Congress.99
III. LEGISLATION PRIOR TO THE ADA
The role that disability advocates would like Congress to play at
the present time in passing MiCASSA parallels congressional efforts
that began twenty-five years ago to combat discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities. 100 This early civil rights legislation includes the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Developmental Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 ("DDA Act"). 101
 These statutes helped to
inspire the overall vision of the ADA as well as its specific provisions
92 See id.
" See id. § 2 (a), (b).
94 Id. § 2(a)(3).
93 See id. § 2(b)(2).
MiCASSA, supra note 91, at § 4 (c) (1)—(1 I).
97 See Id. § 2(a)(5), (c) (1).
98 See id. § 3(10 (1)(B).
99 See id. at
m See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
101 See id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994, Stipp. 11 1096 S.: Stipp. III 1997).
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with respect to community integration.' 02 In order to understand fully
the impact of the ADA on the issue of community integration, it is first
necessary to examine this prior legislation.'"
A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("s 504") was the
first federal statute to deal with discrimination against individuals with
disabilities and is often referred to as "the civil rights bill of the
disabled."'" The purpose of § 504 was to rectify "the country's 'shame-
ful oversights,' which caused the handicapped to live among society
`shunted aside, hidden, and ignored."' 1 " The relevant portion of § 504
reads, "rnlo otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
. . ."Hi" The coordinating regulations of the Department of Justice
state that entities that receive federal funding must "administer pro-
grams and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified handicapped persons." 1 °7 Congress later incorpo-
rated these anti-discrimination principles into Title II of the ADA. 1 "8
Although § 504 was an attempt to combat discrimination against
individuals with disabilities, it fell short of its ultimate goal for several
reasons, including limited applicability and choice of language." Sec-
tion 504 focuses only on discriminatory actions taken by federally-
funded programs and excludes programs managed by private employ-
ers or state and local activities that do not receive federal assistance."°
In addition to its limited applicability, § 504 has problematic language,
centering on the use of the words "otherwise" and "solely.'" Section
504 uses the language "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
102
 So' anigdorf, supra note 44, at 414.
103 See i Tin notes 153-225 and accompatiyiitg text for a discussion of lie role of the Al/A in
relation to !be issue of community integration.
1 " Set' Al/APT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1187 (3d Cir. 1989).
101 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 (1985) (quoting Represer native Vanik, who
originally introduced § 504 as rut amendment to Title VI, 117 CLING. Roe. 45974 (1971)).
1 °6 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
103 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (1998).
1 °8 See Easley Y. Snider, 36 F,3d 297, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1994).
109 &violin J. Coleman 111 & Marcel L. Debruge, A Praclitioner'5 Introduction to ADA Title II,
45 ALI. L. REV 55 57 (1993); Burgdorf, supra note 44, at 430-31.
110
 See Coleman & Debruge, supra note 109, at 57.
"'See Burgdorl, supra note 44, at 522 11.93.
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Ital." Consequently, plaintiffs attempting to bring claims under § 504
have the difficult burden of establishing the prima facie element that
they are "otherwise qualified."" 3 The phrase "solely by reason of .. .
disability" is likewise problematic, implying that only discrimination
motivated solely by an individual's disability is actionable)" Such an
interpretation leaves open the question of discrimination based on
other motivations. " 5
The coordinating regulations of § 504 include a provision that has
ultimately provided a loophole, allowing defendants in discrimination
cases to offer an affirmative defense for practices that appear to violate
the statute. 18 The "undue hardship regulation" states that "[a] recipi-
ent shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or -
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommoda-
tion would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its pro-
gram." Although there is no bright-line test to determine what con-
stitutes an undue hardship, the regulations list several guiding factors:
"(1) The overall size of the recipient's program ... ; (2) [t]he type of
the recipient's operation, including the composition and structure of
the recipient's workforce; and (3) [t]he nature and cost of the accom-
modation needed." 18 The undue hardship regulation allows defen-
dants to claim that compliance with the plaintiff's demands would be
too expensive and would place an excessive cost burden on the plain-
tiff.' 19
The United States Supreme Court twice attempted to define the
scope of § 504) 20 First, in 1979, in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, the Court held that § 504 does not compel educational institu-
tions to take affirmative action to make significant modificatiofis in
112 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 20 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added).
113 Sce Burgdorf, sigma noire 44, at 522 11.93. BUI whirl further explains, "Ialignably, the
notion of otherwise qualified should be subsumed in the question oldiscrimination on the basis
of disability: if au individual is denied an opportunity because of a failure 10 meet qualifications
standauls, then that individual is not being disad•cantaged on the basis of clisability, but rather
because of a failure to meet applicable job standards." Id. at 442. An added problem is that the
Term 'otherwise" is somodiat offensive and demeaning toward an individual with a disability,
characterizing the disability as a negative attribute. See id.
1 " See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added); Burgdorf, sutra note 44, at 522 it.93.
115 See id.
116 See Wood, supra note 60, at 505.
117 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (emphasis added).
16 See 28 C.F.R. § 42.51(c); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (saine).
119 See M'oo't, 5/IPM note (iO, at 505.
12° See Choate, 469 U.S. at 309; Southeastern Community College v. 1)avis, 442 U.S. 397, 414
(1979).
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their programs to accommodate individuals with disabilities when such
modifications would create a fundamental alteration in the nature of
the progrant. 121 In Davis, a woman who suffered from a severe hearing
disability brought a claim against Southeastern Community College, a
state institution that received federal funding, alleging, inter aria, that
the college's denial of her admission to the nursing program violated
§ 504. 122 The Court stated that in certain circumstances it may be
unreasonable and discriminatory for a program to refuse to take affir-
mative action and make modifications to meet the needs of "qualified
handicapped persons: 12 '4 The Court defined an "otherwise qualified
person" as one who could meet the requirements of the program in
spite of the individual's cisability. 124 The Court explained, however, that
in this case it seemed unlikely that the plaintiff could participate in
and benefit from the program even with substantial modifications. 12'
Therefore, the Court held that Southeastern Community College did
not violate § 504 because the statute does not compel entities to take
affirmative action to make substantial modifications that would funda-
mentally alter the nature of the program. 12" The Court further held
that such substantial modifications "would constitute an unauthorized
extension of the obligations imposed by [§ 504]." 127 Following Davis,
several federal court decisions applied the narrow holding of the case
to the provision of home and community-based services and held that
§ 504 did not create a statutory right to receive treatment in the
community. 128
The Supreme Court continued the analysis begun in Davis con-
cerning the scope of § 504 in its 1985 decision in Alexander v. Choate.' 29
In Choate, the Court held that disparate-impact discrimination does
not necessarily constitute a prima facie case of discrimination under
§ 504. 1 "" Medicaid recipients brought a class-action claim against the
State of Tennessee for reducing from 20 to 14 the number of inpatient
hospital days for which the State would pay each year under Medi-
121 See 442 U.S. at 411, 414.
122 See id. all 400-02.
121 See id. at 412-13.
121 14. at 406.
123 See id. at 400.
126 See Davis, 442 U.S. at 411.
127 See irl. at 410.
l"See, e.g.. Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded CitiZCIIS, hIC. v. Connecticut, 674 F.2d 582, 585 (6111
Cir, 1082); Sabo v. 011annon, 586 F. Stipp. 1132, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Garrity v. Gallen. 522 1! ..
Supp. 171, 213 (D.N.1 - 1. 1981).
129 See 460 U.S. at 290,
1 ='-' See id. al 300.
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caid.''' The plaintiffs alleged that such a reduction violated § 504
because it would have a disproportionate effect on individuals with
disabilities and was therefore discriminatory.'" The Court disagreed,
holding that not all instances of disparate impact constitute discrimi-
nation under § 504. 1 " Following the line of reasoning in Davis, the
Court further stated that the reduction in the number of inpatient days
did not deny the plaintiffs "meaningful access to the benefit" of receiv-
ing Medicaid services.':"'The Court stated that modifications to a pro-
gram may be necessary when weighing the rights of individuals with
disabilities to be integrated into society against the interests of the state
to maintain the integrity of its program.'• The Court reasoned that
the "administrative costs of [plaintiffs' requests] would be well beyond
the accommodations that are required under Davis."'m Therefore, the
Court held that in this instance, disparate impact discrimination did
not violate § 504. 117
B, The Developmental Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975
Following the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 but prior
to the passage of the ADA, Congress enacted the Developmental Dis-
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act in 1975, which established a
system of federal-state grants.' 38 Under the DDA Act, the federal gov-
ernment gives money to states to help them create programs for the
care and treatment of individuals with developmental disabilities.'"
Although states utilizing federal funding to run their programs must
meet minimum standards, participation is voluntary. 140 The "Bill of
Rights" provision of the DDA Act states that individuals with develop-
mental disabilities have a right to "appropriate treatment" in "the
setting that is least restrictive of , .. personal liberty. "141 The phrase
131 See id. at 289.
132 See id. at 290. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
dismissed the complaint, holding that the reduction in the number of inpatient days was not the
type of discrintinatiott that § 504 prohibited. See id. at 292 n.6. The United States Court olAppeals
for the Sixth Chetah disagreed, holding that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of
discrimination tinder § 504 because the reduction would disproportionately affect individuals
with disabilities. See Id, at 291-92.
133 See id. at 309.
Im See Choate, 469 U.S. at 301-02.
133 See id. at 300.
136 See id. at 308,
137 See id. at 309.
III See 42 U.S.C. §§ 60004083.
139 See id. § 6000(6)(1).
140 See id. § 6000(c).
1411 See id. § 6000(2).
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"least restrictive" has played a major role in disability litigation during
the past twenty-five years. 14 "
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the right.
to treatment in the least restrictive environment under the DDA Act
in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman. 143 In Pennhurst, a
1981 decision, the Court held that under the "Bill of Rights" provision
of the DDA Act, individuals with disabilities do not have a substantive
right to receive treatment in the . least restrictive environment."' In
Pennhurst, an individual with mental retardation who was a resident at
the Pennhurst State School and Hospital ("Pennhurst") brought a
claim on behalf of herself and the other residents at Pennhurst, alleg-
ing that the unsanitary, inhumane and dangerous conditions at the
institution violated the residents' rights under the DDA Act. 145 The
plaintiff argued that the Court shbulcl require the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to close Pennhurst and create alternative comtnunity-
based living arrangements.'" The Court stated that it had to look
beyond the explicit language of the DDA Act and instead "look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy . . . ." 147 The
Court reasoned that an analysis of the "Bill of Rights" provision in the
context of other specific provisions of the DDA Act reveals that it
merely represents a preference on the part of Congress for commu-
nity-based treatment and does not require states to provide such treat-
ment. 14r' The Court further observed that there is nothing in the "Bill
of Rights" provision to suggest that a particular kind of treatment is a
condition for receiving federal fuiading under the DDA Act, and that
the funding sections of the DDA Act are separate from the "Bill of
Rights" provision and merely encourage states to participate. 14" There-
fore, the Court held that in spite of the language of the statute,
individuals with disabilities do not have a substantive right under the
DDA Act to receive community-based treannent. 15° Additionally, the
Court held that the DDA Act does not compel the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to close Pennhurst and create alternative community
142 See Parry, supra note 45, at 028.
"3 See 451 U.S. 1,18 (1981).
".1 See id. at 18-19.
11 ' See id. at G.
"6 See id.
117 /d. at 18 (quoting Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707,713 (1975)).
1411 See Pennhursi, 451 U.S. at 19.
149 See id. at 23-24.
150
 See id. at 18.
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placements. 151 Pennhurst has subsequently become the seminal case
used by states in their arguments against deinstitutionalization. 152
• IV. THE ADA AND CASE LAW LEADING UP TO OLMSTEAD
In response to the limitations of earlier legislation such as § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the DDA Act of 1975, Congress
enacted the ADA in 1990 with the clear objective of ending discrimi-
nation for individuals with disabilities.'" One commentator has stated,
"The ADA constitutes a second-generation civil rights statute that goes
beyond the 'naked framework' of earlier statutes and acids much flesh
and refinement to traditional nondiscrimination The ADA
passed by a large majority in both houses and with bipartisan sup-
port.'" When enacting the ADA, Congress noted that "the Nation's
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equal-
ity of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for such individuals[.] " 156
 Similarly, upon signing the
ADA into law, President Bush made the following statement: "The
Americans with Disabilities Act presents us all with an historic oppor-
tunity. It signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion
of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life." 157
At the time, Congress estimated that there were approximately
43,000,000 Americans with mental or physical disabilities.'"
The legislative history of the ADA reveals considerable discussion
about the importance of integrating individuals with disabilities into
the community.'" For example, the House Report stated that "[t] he
ADA is a comprehensive piece of civil rights legislation which promises
a new future: a future of inclusion and integration, and the end of
exclusion and segregation."'''° Similarly, the House Report compared
the institutional segregation of individuals with disabilities to the seg-
regation that African-Americans experienced, stating that "segregation
151 .See id.
152 See Bessetie, supra note 5, at 143.
153 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
15.1 Bergdorf, supra note 44, at 415.
155 See id. at 433-34 •noting that the House passed the ADA bill on July 12,1990 by a vote
of 377 to 28 and the Senate passed the bill on July 13,1990 by a vote of 91 to 6).
156 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
157
 Presideni George Bush, Pub. L. No. 101-336, Americans vial Disabilities Act of 1990,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601 (statement upon signing S. 933) (1990).
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1).
I 59 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111) at 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
448-49.
1169 Id„ reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,449 (emphasis added).
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for persons with disabilities 'may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.
Section 12132 of Title II of the ADA, the relevant. portion of the
legislation to this Note, states that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from partici-
pation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity." 162 The ADA omits the word "otherwise" preceding the
phrase "qualified individual. with a disability," which proved problem-
atic in § 504 because it required plaintiffs to establish the prima facie
element that they were "otherwise qualified." 163 Moreover, the ADA, in
contrast to § 504, also excludes the term "solely" preceding the phrase
"by reason of such disability.'' 64 The word "solely" implied that only
discrimination motivated by an individual's disability was actionable
and left open the question of discrimination based on other motiva-
tions.' 65 With tile omission of these two words, the language of the ADA
is broader and less limiting than that of § 504.' 4 '6
The ADA specifies that the Department ofJustice has the authority
to establish implementing regulations with regard to public entities."' 7
The ADA further indicates that these regulations must be consistent
with the coordinating regulations of § 504." The implementing regu-
lations of the Department of Justice for the ADA state that "a public
entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities."'" This provision parallels the similar provision in the co-
ordinating regulations of § 504. 170 The interpretation of the phrase "ill
the most integrated setting appropriate" is at the center of the current
debate concerning the provision of home and community-based serv-
ices."'
In addition to the words "in the most integrated setting appropri-
ate," the phrases "reasonable modifications" and "fundamentally alter"
161 Id., veprittied in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 448-49 (quoting Brown v. Iloa4t1 of Edttc., 347
U.S. 483, 494 (1954)),
162 See 42 U.S.C. ,§ 12132.




166 See id. at 442-44,
167 See42 U.S.C. )) 12134 (a).
"See 42 U.S.C. 12134(b).
169 28 C.F.R. 35.130(d) (1998) (emphasis added).
17" See 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d).
171 See, e.g., Brief of ADAPT, stelva noter4, at "14-15.
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in the implementing regulations are also significant in relation to the
provision of home and community-based services.' 72 The relevant pro-
vision states: "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity
can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally
alter the service, program, or activity: 173
 This provision enables states
to offer an affirmative defense for an alleged violation of the statute. 174
At the same time, Title II of the ADA does not mention the concept of
"undue hardship" with respect to cost, which was included in § 504. 175
One commentator believes that Congress instructed the Department
of Justice to omit the undue hardship provision with respect to cost
because Congress felt that the benefits of integration greatly surpassed
the hardship that would result from additional costs. 176
The interpretation of the phrases "in the most integrated setting
appropriate" and "fundamentally alter" came to the foi:efront of the
debate concerning the provision of home and community-based serv-
ices in Helen L. v. DiDario.' 77 In Helen L., a 1995 decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that under the ADA
individuals are entitled to receive treatment in the most integrated
setting appropriate and that a public entity violates the ADA when it
requires an individual to receive nursing home care against her wishes
when she is qualified to receive home-based Care.' 78 In Helen L., the
plaintiff, a forty-three year-old mother who contracted meningitis, was
paralyzed from the waist down and confined to a wheelchair.'" Conse-
quently, she had difficulty with activities such as bathing and shop-
ping, 18° The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ("DPW") of-
fered two programs for individuals with physical disabilities who
needed help with certain daily activities."' One, funded through Medi-
caid, provided nursing home care; the other provided home or coin-
munity-based care through an "attendant care program," as authorized
' 12 See, e.g., Amiens Curiae Brief of the States in Support of Pe660ners at *8, Olinsteatl
L.C. ex eel. Ziutritig, 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536) [hereinafter Brief of the States].
173 28	 § 35.130(6) (7) (emphasis added).
171 See id.
' 15 See 28 C.F.R. § 41.53.
''6 See Cook, supra note 37, at 430-31.
177 See 46 FM 325 (3d Cir. 1995), red. denied, Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Welfare v.
!dell S., 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
' 18 See id. at 333, 337-38.
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by a Pennsylvania statute.n 2 Professionals evaluated the plaintiff and
found her eligible for attendant care services."" The Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, however, placed her on a waiting list to receive atten-
dant care services, requiring her to remain in a nursing home. 184 The
plaintiff brought a claim against the Pennsylvania DPW, alleging that
the DPW had violated Title H of the ADA by forcing her to live in the
segregated setting of a nursing home.'"'
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the DPW, finding that
the DPW had not discriminated against her based on her disability but
rather. due to a lack of funds.' 86 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, however, reversed, holding that under the ADA
individuals are entitled to receive services in the most integrated set-
ting appropriate and that denial of such services by a public entity
constitutes a violation of the ADA. 17 The United States Supreme Court
declined to grant certiorari, 188 •
The Third Circuit reasoned that "integration is fundamental to
the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act" and that the
legislative history of the ADA reveals that unjustified segregation is the
type of discriminatiOn the drafters intended to eliminate.'" The court
noted that all parties agreed that the most integrated setting appropri-
ate for the plaintiff was her home.'"° The DPW, however, argued that
it could not provide treatment in the plaintiff's home without funda-
mentally altering its mental health system.m Funding for both the
nursing home and attendant care programs had already been set for
the fiscal year, and according to Pennsylvania's Constitution, funds
from one program could not be transferred to the other. 1 "2 The court
responded that the explanation of the DPW concerning the need to
shift funds was inadequate.'" Moreover, the court stated that the plain-
tiff was not asking the DPW to make a change in either the require-
ments for admission to the program or in the substantive nature of the
L " See Helen L., 45 F.311 at 328-29.
183 See id. al 320.
I " See id.
101 See id.
See id.
' 87 See Helen L., 45 F.3(1:11 329.
I80
	 PC1111SylVallia S•O'Clary of Pub. WelFare v. Well S., 515 U.S. 813,813 (1995).
ISO See Helen L., 45 F.3(1 al 332-33.
L911 See id. at.337.
191 Sec
102 See id.
1 " See id.
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program, both of which would constitute a fundamental alteration.I 94
The court concluded that providing attendant care for the plaintiff in
her home would not create a fundamental alteration in Pennsylvania's
attendant care or nursing home program.'
The court further stated that the DPW could not justify adminis-
tering its attendant care program in a discriminatory manner because
of a state funding mechanism already in place and then argue that
compliance with the ADA would involve a fundamental alteration of
its program. 196 The court referred to the legislative history of the ADA,
which stated that [t] he fact that it is more convenient, either admin-
istratively or fiscally, to provide services in a segregated manner, does
not constitute a valid justification for separate or different services
under . . . [Title II of the ADA]."'''/ 7
 The Third Circuit thus held that
the DPW's failure to provide services in the most integrated setting
appropriate for the plaintiff constituted a violation of the ADA. 1 's
Ironically, according to the statement of facts presented in the
court's decision, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was spending, on
average; $45,000 per year to care for the plaintiff in a nursing home
while the cost of appropriate home care would have been only
$10,500.' 99 Therefore, by requiring the DPW to provide home care for
the plaintiff, the court was not imposing a large expense on the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania. 200 One commentator suggested that the
Third Circuit in Helen L. did not adequately address the issue of cost
in relation to the provision of home and community-based services
because it only discussed costs with regard to this particular case—that
is, the court made a simple comparison between the cost of providing
care for one particular individual in her home and the corresponding
cost of maintaining the same individual in an institution.m The court
therefore failed to provide standards to help guide future courts to
determine the impact of cost. 2D2
Following Helen L., there have been several district court cases
concerning the issue of community placement under the ADA. 20" For
"" See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 337.
195 See id,
196 See id. at 338.
197 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111) at 29, rilninled in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 473).
"See id. at 333, 339.
199 See Helen L., 46 F.3t1 at 338.
200 See id.
291 See Wood, RIM note 60, at 501, 513.
202 See Id. at 501.
2"See, e.g., Kathleen S. v. Department of Pula. Welfare, 10 F. Stipp. 2d 460 (E.D. Pa. 1998):
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example, in 1996, in Williams v. Wasserman, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland held that while the ADA does not
require states to create a new program or fundamentally alter an
existing community-based program, the ADA does require states to
provide community placement to qualified individuals with disabili-
ties. 244 In Williams, a group of residents in state institutions brought a
claim against the State of Maryland, alleging that Maryland did not
follow the determination of the state's professionals, who had recom-
mended that the residents were able to live hi the community. 215 Mary-
land argued that placing the plaintiffs in a community setting would
necessitate a redesign of its mental health program through the crea-
tion of a large number of community placements. 206 The plaintiffs
claimed that they were not asking for fundamental changes in Mary;
land's mental health system but rather were requesting "admission to
an existingprogram of treatment on behalf of plaintiffs for whom such
treatment is recommended: 207 Both sides gave a different assessment
of the expected cost. 208 The court reasoned that the Third Circuit's
holding in Helen L. would not require a fundamental alteration in a
state's program that involved the transfer of a large amount of funds
from institutions to community care. 20" The court, however, denied
Maryland's motion for summary judgment, rejecting its claim that
providing coinmunity placement for the plaintiffs would require a
"'precipitous' transfer of funds to create 'hundreds' of community
treatment slots." 210
Similarly, in 1998, another district court case relied on the Third
Circuit's decision in Helen L. 21' In Kathleen S. v. Department of Public
Welfare, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's DPW
violated the ADA's integration mandate by its failure to provide com-
munity-based services to individuals for whom such services were ap-
propriate and by its utilization of discriminatory methods of achnini-
v, Wasserman, 937 F. Stipp. 524 (1). Md. 1990); Charles Q. v. Houston, No. GIN'. A.
UN-95-280,1996 WI- 447549 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1996) (meat.).
2" See 937 F. Stipp. at 530.
' 7' See id. al 520.
2U6 See id. at 528.
2u7 M. (emphasis added). See infra tioles 347-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the difference between expansion of existing services and creation of IICAY programs,
298 See Williams, 937 E Stipp. at 928.
20 See id. at 531.
2L6 See id. at 928,531.
L See Kathleen 5., 10 F. Stipp. 2d at 468-89.
1244	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 (Vol. 40:1221
stration iii planning.212 In Kathleen S., 255 residents at Haverford State
Hospital ("HSH") brought a claim against the DPW, alleging violation
of the ADA as a result of the DPW's failure to provide community
placement and to develop a plan that began within a reasonable time
period and moved at a reasonable pace. 213 The plaintiffs argued that
they were not asking the DPW to create new programs but rather to
expand the DPW's capacity to provide existing programs to additional
individuals. 2 ' 4
 The plaintiffs also argued that cost was not a factor.-' 1 r'
Because the DPW was closing an entire institution and because the cost
of providing community placement was less than that of providing
institutional care, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania would actu-
ally realize a savings by placing the plaintiffs in community-based set-
tings. 216
 As noted by the Secretary of Public Welfare in her announ-
cement regarding plans to close HSH, the closing of institutions re-
flected a nationwide trend toward community integration and `[a]ii
integrated system of community and residential support . . . makes
good sense for the consumer, the taxpayer and the entire courant-
nity."217 Prior
 to this announcement, the DPW had convened a Task
Force that issued a report delineating a re-structuring of the mental
health system of Pennsylvania with the goal of creating a more inte-
grated system. 218
 The Task Force had recommended the consolidation
of HSH and another facility by placing many of the residents in com-
munity-based settings."'`' The DPW, however, did not issue a plan re-
garding the consolidation until seven months had elapsed. 22°
212 See id. at 476.
219 See id. at 462; see also Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum at 9-10, 32 Kathleen S., 10 F.
Stipp. 2d at 382-84 [hereinafter Kathleen S. Post-Trial Meitt.j. See infra notes 382-88 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of state plans moving at a reasonable pace.
2" See Kathleen S. Post-Trial Mein., AUPla note 213, at 24-26. See infra notes 347-55 and
accompanying text for a discussion.of the difference between expansion of existing services and
creation of new programs.
215 See Kathleen S. Post-Trial Mem., supra note 213, at 21-23.
212 See id. at 23.
217
 Kathleen S., 10 F. Stipp. 2t1 at 463.
218
	at 463-64.
219 See id. at 463. The DPW had not recommended community placement for all of the
plaintiffs. See id. at 465. Under the provisions of its plan for closing FISH, the DPW had agreed
to Iliad alt indepencletit assessment for ally resident who requested one. See Kathleen S. Post-Trial
Mem., strpra note 213, at 33. The plaintiffs alleged that the DPW had not followed through with
the provisions of its plan and that it had fitiled to conduct a comprehensive assessment of all of
the residents of FISH. See id. at 33, 39. The plaintiffs' independent expert Identified several
residents, for whom the DPW had not recommended.
 community placement, as capable 01 living
in tile communhy. See id. at 11. See also infer notes 277-98 and accompanying text for a discussion
of assessments made by state and independent professionals.
225
 See Kathleen S., 10 F. Snip. 2d at 465.
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The court held that in enacting the ADA, Congress intended to
strengthen the mandate instituted in § 504 and its coordinating regu-
lations that individuals with disabilities should be integrated into the
community,221 Relying on the Third Circuit's reasoning in Helen L., the
district court found that unnecessary segregation constitutes a form of
discrimination under the ADA. 222 The court rejected the DPW's argu-
ment that the plaintiffs were seeking deinstitutionalization and that the
"planning and preparation of community services and facilities" for
the plaintiffs would create a fundamental alteration in the mental.
health program of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 22' Therefore,
the district court held that the DPW's failure to provide community ,
placement for individuals for whom its own professionals had deter-
mined that such placement was appropriate violated the integration
regulation of the ADA. 224 Similarly, the court held that the DPW used
discriminatory methods of administration by failing to plan adequately
for the placement of individuals in the community and by failing to
provide a reasonable rate of placement. 225
Thus, the Third Circuit's decision in Helen L. became the standard
On which subsequent courts have relied. 226 The decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Olmstead v. L.C. ex
rd. Zimring similarly relied on Helen L. 227 It is interesting that in the
Case of Helen L., the United States Supreme Court refused to grant
certiorari, while in the case of Olmstead, the Court agreed to do so. 228
As will be discussed in the next, two sections, the Supreme Court's
ruling in Olmstead represents a departure, in certain respects, from the
decision of the Third Circuit in Helen L.222
221 See id. n 468.
222 See id.
228 See id. at 470-71.
22 ' 1 See id. at 472, 476.
225 See Kathleen S., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 472,,476.
226 See supra notes 203-25 and accompanying text.
227 See L.C. ex trl. Ziniring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 803, 809, 901, aff'd in part, vacated in part,
remanded, 110 S. Ct. 2176 (1990) (No. 1)8-536).
228 Compare Olmstead v. L.C. ex wL Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 617, 617 (1998), with Pennsylvania
Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Idyll S., 516 U.S. 813, 813 (1995), Perhaps the Supreme Court decided
to grant certiorari in Olmstead because twenty-two states and the Territory or Guam filed a brief
urging the Court to do so. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185 11.8.
229 See infra notes 230-426 vial accompanying text.
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V. OLMSTEAD V. L. EX REL. ZIz%IRING:
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Iii 1999, in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, the United States
Supreme Court held that the unjustified segregation of individuals
with mental disabilities in institutions constitutes discrimination under
the ADA. 2" The Court also held that the ADA requires states to provide
placement for individuals with mental disabilities in coMmunity set-
tings rather than in institutions when: (1) the state's treatment profes-
sionals determine that such placement is appropriate; (2) the affected
individual does not oppose the placement; and (3) the state can rea-
sonably accommodate the placement without creating a fundamental
alteration, given the state's available resources and the needs of other
individuals with mental disabilities. 23 '
In Olmstead, L.C., a woman with mild mental retardation and
schizophrenia, brought a claim against the State of Georgia. 232 L.C.
alleged that because Georgia's professionals had recommended that
her needs could be more appropriately met in a community-based
setting, her continued confinement in a state psychiatric hospital con-
stituted a violation of Title II of the ADA, the Title II implementing
regulations of the Department of Justice and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amenchnent. 233 E.W., a woman with mild mental
retardation and a personality disorder, intervened and stated an iden-
tical claim.234 Georgia argued that it had not provided community
placement for L.C. and E.1/17. because of a lack of funds and that such
placement would fundamentally alter its mental health system. 235 Geor-
gia further argued, inter alia, that its failure to provide community
placement for L.C. and E.W. did not constitute discrimination "by
reason of" their disabilities under Title 11. 236
23° See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zinillitg,,119 S. Ct. 2176, 2185 (1999).
231 See id. at 2181, 2190.
232 See Brief for Respondents at **5-6, Olmstead (No. 98-536).
233 See Olmstead, 138 F.3d at 895.
231 See id. Both L.C. and E.W. are currently living and thriving in the cominunity. See The
Bazelon Centre ftir Mental Health Law, VI7ao Are L.C. and E.W?<hup://www.bazelon.org/ican-
dew.htinl> (last visited July 6, 1999). L.C. is living in a group home for three persons, receiving
assistance but continually acquiring new skills and adjusting to a very different kind of life from
that she had knoNvii for most of her years in an institution. See id. E.W. is living in her own
apartment and receiving support services..See id.110111 traveled to NVashiligton, D.C. to be present
during the Oral Arguments of the Olmstead case. So! id.
235
 See Olmstead, 119 S, Ct. at 2184.
236 See id,
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia granted partial summary judgment in favor of L.C. and E.W.,
holding that Georgia's actions violated Title II of the ADA and its
implementing regulations. 2" The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision, but also remanded the case
to the district court to determine whether the additional expense to
Georgia as a result of the community placement was unreasonable and
would fundamentally alter the State's mental health program, 2" On
remand, the district court foUnd that the cost of providing placement
in the community for the two women would not be excessive in com-
parison to the State's entire mental health budget. 2"9
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit
"in. substantial part."24° In a decision authored by Justice Ginsburg,
the Court held that unjustified segregation constitutes "discrimination
based on disability."2." The Court rejected the arguments presented by
the State of Georgia, and supported by Justice Thomas in his dissent,
that L.C. and E.W. did not experience discrimination "by reason or
their disabilities and that the segregation of individuals with disabilities
is not actionable discrimination under the ADA because discrimination
necessarily requires a comparison class of similarly situated inclividu-
als. 2" The Court explained, "[w] e are satisfied that Congress had a .
more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced
in the ADA" and cited three non-disability discrimination cases to
support its conclusion. 243 The Court also found that Congress had
intended the .ADA to extend the scope of previous disability rights
237 See Oh/WNW. 138 F.3(1 at 895. The district court did not address the plai n tiffs' constitu-
tional claims. See id. at 895 n.3.
238 See id. Because the district court did not address the constitutional claims, the Eleventh
Circuit. also declined to do so. See id.
239 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185 11.7.
210 See id. at 2181.
211 See id, at 2185. Justices Stevens and Kelllkecly issued separate concurrilig cipiitioits. See id.
Z11 2190 (Stevens,_]., concurring); id. at 2191-94 (Kettiletlyd., concurring). justice Stevens stated
that lie would have preferred to affirm the °Pinion of the Eleventh Circuit. See Olmstead, 119 S.
Ct, at 2190 (Stevens, J., concurring). lit his concutring opiition,instice Kennedy indicated that
he saw the need to apply ;t great deal of deference to the medical recommendations of treating
physicians; expressed concern about the repercussions of deinstinitioihilization; and concluded
that the case should be remanded to the lower courts 10 determine whether discrimination
occurred as a result or dissimilar treatment of those with and those without mental disabilities.
See id, at 2191-94 (Kennedy]., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote the sole dissenting opinion.
objecting to the Court's definition of discrimination and stating that discrimination requires
Aliffetenthd treatment vis-a-vis members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily described
chanicieristic.” See id. at 2194-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242 See id. at 2186.
2.13 Ser id, at 2186 & ii.10.
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legislation, such as § 504 and the DDA Act, and that Congress had
explicitly identified unjustified segregation as a form of discrimination
hi the congressional findings of the ADA. 244 Moreover, the Court noted
that unnecessary segregation perpetuates the stereotypic assumption
that individuals with disabilities are unable to be part of the community
and seriously curtails the opportunities available to individuals with
disabilities to experience aspects of everyday living such as educational
activities and employment and to form relationships with friends and
family. 245
 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the unjustified isolation
of individuals with mental disabilities in institutions constitutes dis-
crimination under the ADA.NG .
At the same time, however, the Court noted that the responsibility
of the states to provide 'community placement is not "boundless." 247
Recognizing that states have a need to provide a range of services to
a large population of individuals with diverse mental disabilities and
an obligation to administer services in an equitable manner, the Court
interpreted fundamental alteration as encompassing more than a shn-
ple comparison of cost between placement in the community for a
particular individual and placement in an institution for that same
individual. 248
 Rather, the Court found that future courts must consider
additional factors in light of a state's available resources—namely,
overall costs, the range of services a state provides to other individuals
with mental disabilities and the responsibility of a state to provide
services in an equitable manner. 249 The Court reasoned that states need
sufficient "leeway" to man-age their mental health systems. 25° Accord-
ingly, the Court held that a state could meet its burden by showing that
"it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan . . . and a waiting list
that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors
to keep its institutions fully populated . . . ." 25 ' The Court also noted
that individuals could not receive community placement ahead of
others on the waiting list,merelyby filing a lawsuit.'
In keeping with its explanation of the fundamental alteration
defense, the Supreme Court rejected the interpretation of the Eleventh
211 See Oltasiead, 119 S. C.1. at 2186-87.
215 .S'ee id. at 2187.
44.
 See id. at 2185.
217 .5ee id. at 2188.
218 See id. at 2185.
249 See Olmmead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185.
25° See iti. at 2189.
251 Id.
2511 See id. at 2190.
September 19991	 INTEGRATION OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 	 1249
Circuit, stating that the lower court erroneously focused on a simple
cost comparison.In The Supreme Court found the latter to be unduly
restrictive and virtually unworkable for the states.2" Additionally, the
Court pointed out that the interpretation of the term "fundamental
alteration" used in the implementing regulations of the Department
of Justice must be consistent with the Department's regulations for
§ 504, which included a provision pertaining to "undue hardship." 2r"
The Court noted that the regulations for § 504 define "undue hard-
ship" to mean more than Mere cost; rather, the concept involves a
case-by-case analysis of additional, factors such as the overall size and
type of the program . 2't' Therefore, the Court affirmed the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion in part, vacated it in part and remanded the case to
the district court for au examination of a. variety of factors beyond a
simple cost comparison to determine if the community placement
represented a fundamental alteration of Georgia's program. 257
VI. DISCUSSION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION AND '
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE •
A. Unjustified Segregation Constitutes Discrimination Under the ADA
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Olmstead represents
a critical first step toward achieving the goal of community integration
for individuals with disabilities, a goal envisioned by the drafters of the
ADA nine years. ago. 2's For persons with disabilities who are currently
living in institutions and waiting to receive placement in the commu-
nity, the first part of the Supreme Court's ruling in Olmstead offers
great promise."9 In a powerful statement, the Court declared that the
unjustified segregation of individuals with mental disabilities in insti-
tutions constitutes discrimination under the ADA.26° Such recognition
on the part of the Supreme Court is particularly noteworthy in light
of the nation's unfortunate history of segregating individuals with
mental disabilities in institutions and echoes the intent of Congress in
253
 See id. at 2188-89;
251 See Olmstead, 119 S, Ct. at 2188-89.
255 See id. al 2190 n,16.
256
 See id.
257 See id. at 2190.
253 See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Tinning, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2185 (1999); Americans with
Disabilities Act of' 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2), (a) (5), (11) (1) (1994).
259 See 119 S. Ct. at 2185.
20k1 se,„
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enacting the ADA. 26I Moreover, the Court's ruling accepts the docu-
mented benefits of community integration and acknowledges the nega-
tive impact of institutionalization—for example, the perpetuation of
stereotypic images of individuals with disabilities and the lack of op-
portunity for those individuals in institutions to engage in ordinary life
experiences.262
 Ideally, the positive tone of the Court's ruling in Olm-
stead will not only create optimism among individuals with disabilities,
but will also impact future decisions of lower courts and serve as a
harbinger of change to the states, leading them to emulate the stand-
ard set by the Court. 263
 In this respect, the Court's ruling in Olmstead
represents an important beginning of the realization of community
integration. 2M
It is likewise significant that the Court clearly rejected the argil-.
ment presented by the State of Georgia and supported by Justice
Thomas in his dissent that Georgia's failure to provide community
placement for L.C. and E.W. did not constitute discrimination by
reason of such disability Thomas stated that the Court "has never
endorsed an interpretation of the term 'discrimination' that encom-
passed disparate treatment among members of the same protected
class."266
 The Court responded decisively that the dissent's view was
incorrect on the basis of both "precedent and logic.• 267 According to
the Court, in enacting the ADA, Congress intended a more expan-
sive definition of discrimination. 268 Consequently, following the Court's
ruling in Olmstead, states will no longer be able to argue, as they have
in the past, 'that their failure to provide community placement does
not constitute discrimination by reason of such disability.269
261 See supra notes 28-43, ,156-61 and accompanying text.
262 See 119 S. Ct. at 2187; see also supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
263 See Bill Rankin, Ruling Extends Rights of Mentally Disabled: Georgians Win Partial Victory
in Picking Home, ATLANTA J. & Ari.ANTA CoNsi., June 23,1999, at F4 ('The slate now knows it
GM no longer keep people in an institution when they don't need to he there. Period.") (quoting
Susan Jamieson, attorney for Atlanta Legal Aid, who represented respondents).
264 See 119 S. Ct. at 2185.
265 See id. at 2186. Justice. Kennedy pointed out that the Court's statement about the dissimilar
ireaunent of those with mental disabilities and tliose without mental disabilities suggests a theory
under which the respondents may have been able to prove discrimination
based on their mental disabilities. See id. at 2192 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring).
266 Id. at 2194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 2186 11.10.
269 kl. at 2186.
26`9
	 e.g., Brief for Petitioners at "20-21, Ohnstead (No. 98-536).
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Furthermore, the Court's ruling concerning discrimination by
reason of such disability may have additional implications in the future.
The question of whether actionable discrimination under the ADA
may occur among . classes of indiyiduals with disabilities or whether it
must necessarily occur between individuals with disabilities and those
without disabilities has troubled courts for years. 27° Therefore, the
Court's ruling in Olmstead may provide support in future disability
rights discrimination cases that do not involve community placement
but nonetheless pertain to the issue of discrimination among classes
of ,individuals with disabilities—fOr example, discrimination based on
the differential treatment of persons with severe and mild mental
retardation or those with mental and physical disabilities. 27 '
B. The ADA Requires States to Provide Community Placement Upon
Fulfillment of Three Conditions
While the first part of the Court's ruling in Olmstead represents
an important achievement for individuals with mental disabilities, the
second part has very different implications. 272 In the latter, the Court
held that the ADA does not require states to provide placement in the
community in all situations, but rather imposes such an obligation
upon the fulfillment of three specified conditions. 27" Although the
Court presented the three conditions as a unit, the first two differ from
the third in that they pertain to the meaning of the term "appropriate"
in the integration regulation, while the third relates to a clarification
of the reasonable-Modifications regulation. 274 Each of these conditions
may make it more difficult for an individual to receive coMmunity
placement in the future. 275 . It is the third, however, that creates the
greatest obstacle to the goal of community integration.276
27U Compare, e.g., Flight v. Cloeckler, 68 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that failure to
make modifications based on severity of disability was not discrimination because the Rehabilita-
tion Act Al not clearly establish an obligation to tweet la disabled person's] particular needs
vis-ii-vis the needs of other handicapped individuals, but mandates only that services provided
non-handicapped individuals not be denied Ito a disabled person] because he is handicapped.")
(citing P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1990)), .teith Jackson ex tel. Jackson
Fort Stanton thisp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Stipp. 1243, 1299 (D.N.M. 1990), rend in part on other
grounds, 064 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that severity of disability is itself a disability under
504 and that severity of disability cannot be the sole reason for denying access to community
programs).
271 See, e.g., Flight, 68 F,3(1 at 63; Jackson, 757 F. Stipp. at 1299.
272 See 119 S. Ct. at 2181, 2185, 2190.
271 See id. at 2181, 2190.
274 See id. at 2183, '2188-90.
275 See infm notes 277-399 and accompanying text.
216 See infra notes 319-88 and accompanying text.
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1. Determination by the State's Treatment Professionals
The first condition .specified by the Court is that the state's treat-
ment professionals must determine that community placement is ap7
propriate. 277 At the oral arguments, there was considerable discussion
by the Justices concerning which professionals should be allowed to
make a recommendation for community placement. 278 The Justices
expressed concern that a "battle of the experts" might unfold, with the
state's professionals arguing that community placement is not appro-
priate for a particular individual and a second group of professionals,
testifying on behalf of the individual, arguing the opposite. 279 In Kath-
leen S., for example, an independent expert recommended that com-
munity placement was appropriate for certain individuals for whom
the state's professionals had determined that such placement was in-
appropriate. 2" Therefore, it is likely that the Court specified that the
professionals should be those of the state because it wanted to avoid a
situation involving contradictory professionals. 28 ' Moreover, it is also
quite possible that with respect to professional judgment, the Court
wanted to give the states sufficient leeway to manage their own pro-
grams, as it had done in other parts of its opinion.282
Unfortunately, however, the Court in Olmstead did not address the
question of impartiality in a judgment made by the state's profession-
als. 283 A conflict of interest arises when a state employee—that is, the
professional—must make a decision that adversely affects the financial
situation of his or her employer—that is, the gtate. 284 There is the
possibility that the state's professionals will place the interests of the
state above those of the individual for whom they are recommending
some form of care. 285 According to one Commentator, the terms "pro-
277 .See 119 S. Ct. at 2181, 2190.
2" See Oral Argument Before the United States Supreme Court, Olmstead v. L.C. ex ref.
Zintring, 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536) (Apr. 21, 1999) (transcript available in Ohnslead,
No. 98-536, 1999 WL 252681, at **37-43) [hereinafter Oral Arg.1.
279 See Id. at *38.
28( See Kathleen S. Post-Trial Mem., supra note 213, at 11.
281 See 119 S. Ct. at 2181, 2188, 2190,
282 See id.; see also irtfra notes 319-93 and accompanying text.
283 See Susan Stefan, Leaving civil Rights to the "Experts": Front Deference to Abdication Under
the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 VALE L.J. 639, 655-61 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's paradigm of the neutral mental health professional does not reflect reality).
284 See id. at 655.
283 See, e.g., Jackson ex rel. Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 964 F.2d 980, 992
(10th Cir. 1992) (holding that professionals must make their recommendations for community
placement based on cost considerations); see also Stefan, supra note 283, at 655.
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fessionals" and "professional judgment" automatically connote a false
sense of neutrality • and objectivity. 286 In reality, professionals do not
make decisions in a vacuum; personal and ideological biases inherently
influence their decisions. 287 Therefore, the Court in Olmstead should
have specified, at a minimum, that the determinations regarding com-
munity placement made by the state's professionals cannot be based
on criteria such as administrative and cost concerns. 285
While the Court explicitly indicated that it is the state's profession-
als who are to make the recommendations for community placement,
the Court was less clear regarding the degree of deference courts in
the future should give to the decisions of the state's professionals. 28" In
reference to reliance on determinations made by the state's profession-
als, the Court used the rather vague expression that "the State generally
may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in deter-
mining whether an individual 'meets the essential eligibility require-
ments' for habilitation in a community-based program." 29" The terms
"generally may" and "reasonable assessments" used by the Court hope-
fully leave open the possibility that an individual in the future might
contest the recommendation of the state's professionals. 2•' In such a
case, the burden will be on the individual to prove that the state's
professionals either were not qualified to make such an assessment or
that the state's professionals did not make a reasonable assessment. 292
Following the Court's decision in Olmstead, individuals with dis-
abilities arguing for comnmnity placement and their attorneys may
find themselves in an awkward position. It is important to remember
that in many cases, it was the state's professionals who had recom-
mended community placement. 293 For L.C. and E.W., for example, the
286 See Stefan, supra note 283, at 648, 655.
217 See id.
288 See, e.g., Clark v. Cohen. 613 E Stipp, 684, 704 (EA). Pa. 1985), alp 704 17,2d 79 (3d Cir.
1986) (stating that professional judgment should "be based on medical or psychological criteria
and not ott exigenc)'. administrative convenience, or other criteria."); Brief for' the
United Stales, ItIPIV note 79, at *10 (stating that professional judgment should not be "affected
by extraneous considerations such as administrative COUNCitience and costs").
289 See 119 S. Ct. at 2188. The Supreme Court had previously addressed the issue of deference
to state professionals in a 1982 case. concerning a substantive due process right to "minimally
adequate training." See Youitgberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318, 322-23 (1082) (holding that
determinations of neatinent professionals deserve a great deal of deference and arc to be treated
as "preStltliptiVCIy Valid"): we also School Rd. of Nassau (luting. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987)
("in making ifindings of ilict), courts normally should defer to the reasonable medical judgments
of public health officials.").
290 See arm,steari, 119 S. Ca. at 2188 (emphasis added).
291 See id,; see also Kathleen S. Pust:frial Mcnl., supra note 213, at 11, 33, 39.
292 See Oral Arg., supra note 278, at **42-43,
293 See, e.g., 119 S. Cl, at 2188 rflie Slate's own professionals determined that community-
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state's professionals determined that community placement was appro-
priate for the two women prior to their discharge from the state
psychiatric hospita1. 294 Therefore, individuals with disabilities may
benefit if courts defer to the opinions of the state's professionals
because such deference implies that the state would have to provide
community placement for the individuals. 29' At the same time, however,
individuals with disabilities and their attorneys may find themselves
asking whether they want the courts to invest so much deference and
power in the decisions of professionals paid by the state. 296 Hopefully,
the state's professionals will exercise objectivity and fairness to the
fullest extent possible in keeping with their role as "professionals." 297
Depending on the facts of the case, however, an individual may want
to contest the recommendation of the state's professionals and present
a second opinion from an independent professional:298
2. Affected Individual Does Not Oppose Community Placement
The second condition included as part of the Court's holding is
that the affected individual must not oppose the community place-
ment. 299
 This condition, although it does not contain the word "appro-
priate," also speaks to the issue of appropriateness in the integration
regulation."° The Court seemed to be concerned with the impact of
the decision regarding community placement on the individual, and
to a certain extent this requirement does protect the person.t"t The
specific language used by the Court—namely, the "affected individual"
and "not oppose"—warrants attention."2
based treatment AVOIlki be appropriate for L.C. and E.W...."); Helen L. v. f)iDario, 46 E3d 325,
329 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Pennsylvania Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Well S., 516 U.S. 813
(1995) ("DPW agrees that 'the most integrated setting appropriate to !the plaintiff!' is her !tome
. . ."); Kathleen S. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Stipp. '2/1 460, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
("[There are] approximately 95 class members who have heel' identified by DPW as appropriate
for treatment in the community b u t ... for whom facilities and services at c not presently available
for their treatment in the c01111111Illily,").
291 See 119 S. Ct. at 2188.
293
 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at *5, Olmstead (No. 98-536) (noting that Georgia profes-
sionals had identified 523 indhiduals ill IilstiiiI dotis who could be served more appropriately in
the community, but who remained
296 See supra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
297 CI Oral Arg., supra note 278, at *41.
2" See, e.g., Kathleen S. Post•Trial Mein., supra note 213, at 11, 33, 39.
299 See 119 S. Ct. at 2181, 2190.
"9 See id. at 2188 (finding that both the requirement that the state's professionals recom-
inend that community placement is appropriate and the requirentent I hat the individual not
oppose the placement determine whether the i ndividual is "qualified" for C01111111111ity placement).
99 I See id.
302 See id. at 2181, 2190.
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The Court did not elaborate on the meaning of the term "affected
individual.'" Since a parent or guardian is often involved in situations
pertaining to individuals with mental disabilities, the requirement as
articulated raises a question regarding the respective roles of the indi-
vidual and the parent or guardian. 3" There is the possibility that an
individual may clearly express a desire to be placed in the community,
while the individual's parent or guardian opposes such placement."'
The State of Connecticut, for example, provides parents and guardians
with the right to notice and a hearing prior to the transfer of their
children or wards to the community."6 Hopefully, because the Court
used the words "affected individual," future courts will interpret this
phrase to mean the individual, and not a third party guardian, in cases
in which there is a difference of opinion. 307
The Court used the words "not oppose," apparently following the
language of the implementing regulations of the ADA.308 The Court
noted that there is no federal requirement that community placement
be imposed on an individual who does not want such placement:• The
Court cited the implementing regulations of the ADA, which state that
'an individual should not he required to accept an unwanted placement
and that an individual must have the option of declining a particular
placemeiit.TM° The requirement of "not oppose" is an easier condition
to fulfill than "consent to," which would necessitate some indicia of
consent on the part of the individua1. 3 "
303 See id.
301 See, r.g., Stanley S. Herr, iiet»mentation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and
Control, 17 N.V.U. REV. L. F.: Soc. CHANGE 609, 614 (1989/1000) ("guardians . . . may have
interests that conflict or at least diverge ill Millie respects from those of the person
305 See, e.g., David H. Neely, Handicapped Advocacy: Inheamt Barriers and Partial Solutions in
the Repre,sentation of Disabled Children, :13 HASTINGS Li. 1359, 1399 (1082) (arguing that the law
is unclear tin. lawyers of clients with mental "regardhig In.iw the client's expressed
desires are to be represented if they conflict with those of the guardian.").
9W Se' Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 183 F.R.D. 350, 359 (1). Conn. 1908) (citation
onnited).
307 See 110 S. Ct. at 2181, 2100.
3°8 See id. at 2188.
3" See id. The requirement that the individual not oppose the placement is somewhat
analogous to the requitentelll in the federal Medicaid statute which mandates that states partici-
pating in the 11C1IS Waiver Program lutist inform eligible individuals of the possible alternatives
and provide such individuals with a choice of services. See supm title 75 mid accompanying text.
stn See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e) ( I) (1908) and 28 C.F.R. pt.
35, app. A, 450 (1998)).
513 See, e.g., Deinuis P. Saccuzzo, Legal Regulation of Behavior Modification for Developmentally
Disabled and Other Handicapped Persons, 25 011I0 N.U. L. RF.v. 27, 37-38 (1999).
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It is noteworthy that the holding of the Court concerning the
appropriateness of the placement vis-a-vis the role of the decision of
the state's professionals and the role of the affected individual reflects
the Court's strong opposition to deinstitutionalization. 312
 The Court
pointed out that the ADA does not mandate community placement for
all individuals with disabilities—that is, the state's professionals must
recommend that the community is the appropriate setting for the
particular individual, and the affected individual must not oppose such
placement.'"s At the oral arguments, the justices expressed concern
regarding the repercussions of a massive emptying of the institutions.""
Justice Kennedy articulated this apprehension in his concurring opin-
ion."'' This fear reflects the negative connotations associated with the
term deinstitutionalization."'" Although deinstitutionalization began as
a positive step in response to the pervasive institutionalization of per-
sons with disabilities, its meaning has changed over the years, and
deinstitutionalization has come to symbolize the release of large mini-
hers of individuals onto the street without adequate support program-
ming.o'tn Disability advocates have agreed that the ADA does not man-
date deinstitutionalization and that community placement is not the
appropriate option for all individuals with disabilities.m 8
3. Reasonable Modifications/Fundamental Alteration
In addition to the two conditions pertaining to the concept of
appropriateness, the Court also held that the reasonable-modifications
regulation limits the obligation of states to provide community , place-
ment." 19 According to the regulation: "A public entity shall make rea-
sonable mocfifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity. " 32° In Olmstead, the Supreme Court tried to clarify
312 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at '2189 ("the ADA is not reasonably read to impel States to phase
out institutions, id:Icing patients in need of close care at tisk.").
313 See id. at 2187 ("We emphasize that nothing in the ADA or its implementing regulations
condones termination pf institutional settings for persons unable to handle or benefit front
community settings.").
314 See Oral Avg., supra 1101e 278, at **47-48,
318 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2191-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
318
 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanyilig text.
317 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
318 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
318 Ser. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188-90.
320 28	 § 35.130(b)(7) (1998) (emphasis added).
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the concept of fundamental alteration by stating that future courts
should consider the following: (1) the overall cost to the state; (2) the
range of existing services the state provides to other individuals with
disabilities; and (3) the state's obligation to provide these services in
an equitable manner.:"' Prior to Olmstead, courts had struggled with
the scope of the fundamental alteration defense. 322 The Third Circuit
in Helen L. referred to a change in the nature of a program or a change
in the requirements for admission to a program as fundamental altera-
tions, but was reluctant to find a fundamental alteration due to a lack
of funds.;'-'3 The problem with the concept of fundamental alteration,
as with that of undue hardship in § 504, is that there is no bright-line
test to determine what constitutes a reasonable modification and what
constitutes a fundamental alteration. 324 Rather, as the Supreme Court
in Alexander v. Choate suggested, an evaluation of a fundamental altera-
tion involves balancing the right of the individual to be integrated into
society against the right of the state to maintain the integrity of its
mental health system."
In discussing the issue of cost, the Supreme Court in Olmstead was
clear that courts in the future should consider overall expenses to the
state rather than a simple cost comparison. 326 The latter involves a
comparison between the cost of providing services in the community
for a particular individual and the corresponding cost of providing
services for that same individual in an 111stitution.327 In a simple com-
parison, care in the community is less expensive.•" The Court noted,
however, that as the number of residents in an institution decreases,
states still incur certain fixed overhead expenses, leading to a higher
per capita cost, unless the facility is closed. 32`I According to the Court,
these fixed costs must be considered hi determining the overall cost
i21 See /10 S. Ct, at 2185. the factors recommended by the Court for future courts to consider
when evaluating a Ituulantental alteration daelISC are similar to mid appear to be as extensive as
the factors included by the Department ofittstice to describe "undue hardship" in the coordinat-
ing regulations of 509. See s hpro note 118 and accompanying text. In rejecting a simple cost
comparison, the Court in Olmstead specifically mentioned the "undue hardship" factors in a
footnote. See 119 5. Ct, at 2109 11.16.
322 See, e.g, Williams v. Wasserman, 037 V, Stipp, 529, 531 (I). Md. 1(1%) (attempting to limit
the Third Circuit's holding in	 L. regarding fundamental alteration),.
• 23 See 46 17.3d at 337,
321 See, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Celli. SC.11, NM., 63 F,3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
unite harclship is a "relational terni"tinit warrants a cost/benelit analysis).
"5 See 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
326 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188-89.
327 See id.
See id.
'21 ' See id. at 2180 ti.15.
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to the state of providing community placement."° The Court noted
that states will be unable to close every institution because there will
always be individuals who must live in such facilities, and further, that
the ADA does not require "states to phase out institutions.'mt Again,
as with the Court's requirements that the state's professionals approve
the placement and the individual not oppose it, this statement reflects
the Court's concern about and disapproval of deinstitutionalization. 3"
The Court further emphasized that some individuals living in the
community may need to return to an institution from time to time to
receive acute psychiatric care, as was the case with L.C. and E.W. 3" As
a result of the Court's rejection of the simple cost comparison in favor
of overall expenses to the state, individuals with disabilities seeking
placement in the community in the future will no longer be able to
argue a simple cost comparison." 4 By focusing on the overall cost to
states, the Court has made it easier for states to prove a fundamental
alteration defense by showing that they will incur excessive expenses
that will fundamentally alter the nature of their mental health sys-
tem.335
Moreover, in its efforts to emphasize the impact of the overall cost
on the capacity of states to provide community-based services, the
Court failed to point out that fixed overhead expenses do not auto-
matically result in a fundamental alteration of a state's program."6
Studies indicate that in the face of reduced institutional populations,
states can deal with fixed costs by implementing measures such as staff
sharing and/or institution consolidation. 3"7 The Court should have
specified that it is not sufficient for states merely to point to the
existence of certain fixed costs."8
 Rather, states should be required to
demonstrate that they are considering alternative approaches to the
issue of costs and that they are also actively seeking more funding."
Furthermore, the Court should have noted that certain policies will be
cost-effective in the long-term and that the benefits of community
5" See id, at 2189.




334 See, e.g., Helen L., 40 F.3d at 329.
335 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188-89.
336 See, e.g., Brief Al Mei Curiae for American Psychiatric Associatiottand the National Alliance
for the Mentally 111 Supporting Respondents at "28-29, Olmstead (No.98-536) Ihereinafter Brief
for Am. Psychiatric Assoc.].
337
 See id. at *29; Brief for United Stales, supra note 79, at *22.
338 See id. at *20 ("Unsubstantiated claims of ... costs ... are no substitute for proof.").
339
 See, e.g., Brief for Am. Psychiatric Assoc., supra note 330, at *29.
September 19991	 IMEGRATION Or ME MENTALLY. DISABLED	 1259
integration may in some instances outweigh the additional costs re-
quired. 34°A stronger message from the Court would have given a sense
of urgency and a need for acceleration in keeping with the earlier part
of its opinion hailing community integration." 1
Also in its attempt to highlight the role of overall cost, the Su-
preme Court hastily rejected the Eleventh Circuit's construction of the
reasonable-modifications regulation as overly narrow and restrictive."'
The Supreme Court itself recognized that the Eleventh Circuit had
found that a determination of a fundamental alteration should consist
of an examination of "other things" in addition to cost." 4s In fact, some
of the "other things" mentioned by the Eleventh Circuit were quite
extensive.' The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district
court to determine, inter alia, "(1) whether the additional expenditures
necessary to treat L.C. and E.W. in community-based care would be
unreasonable given the demands of the State's mental health budget;
(2) whether it would be unreasonable to require the State to use
additional available Medicaid waiver slots . . . ; and (3) whether any
difference in the cost of providing institutional or community-based
• care will [sic] lessen the State's financial burden." 345 As Justice Stevens
stated in his concurrence, the Supreme Court should have affirmed
the decision of the Eleventh Circuit, noting that if the district court
chose to adopt a purely cost-based analysis, such a decision should have
been appealed as an arguable error on the part of the district court. " 3
The second factor noted by the Supreme Court for consideration
in an evaluation of a fundamental alteration defense is the range of
services provided by the state. "47 The Department of Justice has deter-
mined that the ADA does not require states to create new programs
because to do so would require a fundamental alteration."' A further
question, however, pertains to the expansion of already existing pro-
grams."9 Does the ADA require states to expand their current pro-
grams to provide treatment in the most integrated setting appropri-
Rao
	 id. at * 4'27-28; Brief for Respondents at *49, Olmstead (No. 98-536).
" I Si',' Olmstead, 119 S. Ci. at 2185.
"2 See id. at 2188.
343 See id.
"4 See L.C. ex rel. %Miring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905, affel in part, vacated in trail,
remanded, 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
m6 See Olmstead, i l9 S. Ct. al 2190 (Stevens..., concurring).
"7 See id. at 2185.
""' See Brief for the United Slates, supra note 79, at *20 11.3.
319 See, e.g., Kathleen S. Post-Trial Ment,, supra note 213, at 24-26.
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ate?35° The Department of Justice has stated that although the creation
of new programs would constitute a fundamental alteration, the ex-
pansion of existing programs would not." Lower courts similarly have
held that the ADA requires states to expand existing programs to
provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate."" For ex-
ample, in Kathleen S., the plaintiffs argued that "[Of a public entity
could avoid its obligations under the integration mandate simply by
contending that additional capacity in existing programs must be de-
veloped, it would nullify the meaning of the ma ►date."353 The Court
in Olmstead did not specifically answer this question."' It appears,
however, that its answer would be that the ADA requires states to
expand their existing programs, unless doing so would necessitate a
fundamental alteration . 355
By including range of services as one of the bases of a fundamental
alteration defense, the Court has again, as with overall cost, given the
states greater opportunity to legitimize their reluctance to provide
community placement.358 It will be relatively easy for a state to hide
behind a defense that the requested community placement will funda-
mentally alter the state's range of services by diverting resources from
where they are needed."' For example, a state could henceforth argue
that because it has the enormous responsibility of administering a wide
array of services, it cannot redirect resources of time, persons, funds,
etc. to expand a program to meet the needs of a small group of
individuals."8 The state could therefore argue that such an expansion
would create a fundamental alteration in its overall system.'"
The third factor mentioned by the Court as basic to a fundamental
alteration defense is the equitable distribution ola state's resources."
550 See id.
351 See Brief for the United States, supra note 79, at *20 n.3.
352 See, e.g., Williams, 937 F. Supp. at 530.
353 Kathleen S. Post-Trial Meru., supra note 213, at 25.
35-1 See 119 S. Ct. 2176-00.
333 See id. at 2189.
356 See id. It is interesting that approximately 75% of Medicaid funding goes to institutional
care while only 25% goes to community-based care. See MiCASSA, supra note'91, § 2(a)(1). One
could ask: does such a proportion really constitute a meaningful "range" of services?
337 See Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures, as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at "9-10, antsfead (No. 98-536) (arguing that it should not he a fundamental
alteration for a state to continue to keep an individual confined to an institution when immediate
placement of that individual would disrupt the state's allocation of resources) (hereinafter Brief
of State Legislatures].
358 See id.
359 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2189.
360
 See id. at 2185.
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The Court articulated this concept in several different forms through-
out the opinion without explaining its precise meaning at any time.'""
The Court recognized that states have an obligation "to administer
services with an even hand" and "to mete out those services equita-
bly."""2 Similarly, the Court held that the states could prove the funda-
mental alteration defense by demonstrating that "immediate relief for
the plaintiffs would be inequitable . . .",1u.' The Court further noted
that the placement of individuals with mental disabilities in community
settings must take into account the needs of other individuals with
disabilities.""
By including the equitable distribution of resources, the Court
clearly had in mind a desire for some degree of fairness. 365 Yet, because
this third factor is so vague, it is open to varying interpretations.""" The
Court expressed concern about the impact that the immediate release
of individuals who file lawsuits may have on the services that a state
provides to a diverse population of individuals with mental disabili-
ties.=;'" Moreover, the Court explained that individuals who file lawsuits
to receive community placement cannot jump ahead of others on the
waiting list to receive that placement.ut's Because of its concern for the
equitable distribution of resources, the Court apparently did not want
states to put the needs of those awaiting community placement ahead
of the needs of those requiring institutional care.""" The same argu-
ment, however, holds true in the reverse—where is the equity for
individuals who have been waiting for community placement for five,
ten or even fifteen years?
An additional question concerns individuals currently living at
home, who are on waiting lists to receive community placement or
additional connnunity-based services."'" It is unclear how these indi-
viduals fit into the equity equation."' Although the Court phrased the
361 See rd. at 2185, 2189.
362 Id. at 2185.
563 Id. at 2189.
361 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181, 2190.
365 See id; see also RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 445 (2d ed. 1999)
(defining "equitable" as "Fail'").
364 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185.
367 See id. at 2180.
368 See id. at 2190.
M9 See id.
$7. q Davis, Mr ABC: A Status Report, .supra note 4.
$ 71 See id. The Supreme Court in Olmstead dill not indicate whether "others with mental
disabilities" and "a huge and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities" include those
iudividnals who are living at home and waiting to receive community placement. See 119 S. CI.
at 2181, 2189, 2100.
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provision of services to individuals with mental disabilities in terms of
an equitable distribution of resources, the result seems to be a playing
of one group against the other in the hope that none of the groups—
individuals in institutions requiring institutional care, those waiting for
community placement and those at home waiting for community serv-
ices—is hurt to any great extent. 372
 Such an approach does not appear
to he equitable and certainly does not advance the goal of community
integration.3" With equitable distribution, as with the first two factors,
the Court has given the states room to maneuver in providing place-
ment for individuals in community-based settings. 374
Moreover, while states may argue that increased costs and/or the
need to provide an equitable range of services are the reasons for their
failure to provide community placement, it is important to point out
that states sometimes mask inappropriate motivations under the guise
of more acceptable ones. 375
 For example, states may experience bureau-
cratic resistance to change on the part of administrators or reluctance
to phase down institutions because of a loss of jobs to administrators
and other employees. 376 There may be pressure from state politicians
.to preserve the status quo with respect to institutions in order to
maintain jobs for their constituents.' Resistance may also come from
members of the community who may have a "not in my backyard"
reaction to the creation of group homes for individuals with mental
disabilities. 378 These motivations have nothing to do with cost, range of
services or equitable distribution.'"" In the past, states have sometimes
used the defense of excessive costs to conceal their true motivation."'
The Court's explication of the fundamental alteration defense in terms
of range of services and equitable distributionas well as cost—pro-
vides the states with additional ways to hide their true intentions."'
372
 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct..at 2181,2189,2100.
373 See id.; see also Brief 'Or Ain. Psychiatric Assoc., supra note 336, at **28-29 ("discrimination
against one indivichial is hard to justify on the ground that it benefits another individual ....")
37' 1 See supra notes 326-59 and accompat lying iext.
375 See Brief for Responclenis at *49, Olmstead (No. 98-536); Amiens Curiae Brief of 58
Former State Commissioners and Directors of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities in
Support of Respondents at **23-26, Okstead (No. 98-536) lliereinafier Brief of Former Slate
Commissioners).
376 See Brief of Former State Commissioners, Supra note 375, ai *20.
377 See id. at *25.
378 See id. at *24.
379 See id.; Brief for Respondents at "9-10, Ohnsi•ad (No. 98-536).
38° See Brief of Former State Commissioners, copra note 375, at *26.
381 See Olmstead, 110 S. Ct. at 2185.
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The Supreme Court suggested that a state could satisfy the funda-
mental alteration defense if, for example, it had a "comprehensive,
effectively working plan" with a waiting list moving at a "reasonable
pace."382 While the development of a state plan would certainly be a
positive step, the Court did •not go far enough since it provided no
guidance to the lower courts concerning the parameters of a compre-
hensive plan or the rate of a reasonable pace. 3" lf, for example, an
individual had been institutionalized for ten years and a state plan
required a further three-year wait to receive placement in the commu-
nity, would such a time-frame constitute a reasonable pace? While such
apace may be reasonable for the state, it clearly is not reasonable for
the individual.'"4 Again, the Court has left the states too much oppor-
tunity to avoid the introduction of change in the manner in which they
deliver services to individuals with disabilities. 385 The Court did not
stress the importance of developing an effective plan."86 Nor did the
Court mandate a state plan as a prerequisite for satisfying the funda-
mental alteration defense.'"' The Court should have been more direc-
tive to the lower courts by noting some basic components that a
comprehensive plan should encompass—for example, the substantia-
tion of costs, the reduction of overhead costs by consolidation, full
utilization of a state's allotted HCBS waivers and a system of monitoring
to ensure compliance. "88
The factors specified by the Court as important for evaluating a
fundamental alteration defense are imprecise and therefore provide
too much latitude for states to procrastinate and avoid making changes
toward a more community-based system." 89 Before the Court's decision
in Olmstead, piecemeal litigation occurred among various lower courts
regarding the issue of community placement. 39° The Court's opinion,
unfortunately, will not put an end to this type of litigation."' It is
982 Id. at 2189.
383 See id. The requirement that a waiting list It 	 at a reasonable pace is similar to the
vague requirement or -1 east it wide promptness" in the federal Medicaid staitue. See supra note 64
and accompanying text.
581 See, e.g.. Kathleen S., 10 F. Stipp. 2d at 473 .(finding a three-year state plan to transfer
individuals to community-based settings to be "unreasonable").
385 See Olmstead, 1 19 S. CI. at 2189.
386 See id.
387 See id. (stating that a ciintiprehenshv plan is merely an "example" of how to satisfy the
reasonable-inoilificat ions regulation).
"8 See, e.g., MiCASSA, supra note 91, § 4(a) (1), (c) (1)-(11); see also infra cotes 410-26 mid
accompanying text.
589 See supra notes 319-88 and accompanying text,
See Brief of the Stales, supra note 172, at *8,
391 See Olmstead, 110 S. Ct. at 2188-90.
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therefore critical for future lower courts to be mindful of the principle
set forth by the Supreme Court in the first part of its opinion that
unnecessary segregation , constitutes discrimination under the ADA,
and to hold the states to a stringent standard when evaluating a fun-
damental alteration defense. 3"z In this regard, lower courts can play an
important role in preventing states from shirking their statutory obli-
gation to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate. 303
hi summary, in its ruling in Olmstead, the Court stated that the
ADA requires states to provide community placement for individuals
with mental disabilities when the following three conditions are met:
(1) the state's treatment professionals determine that such placement
is appropriate; (2) the affected individual does not oppose the place-
ment; and (3) the state can reasonably accommodate the placement
without creating a fundamental alteration to its program, given the
state's available resources and the needs of other individuals with
mental disabilities. " 4 The first two conditions speak to the appropriate-
ness of the placement for the individual with disabilities The third,
however, pertains to the needs of the states, and the Court has essen-
tially conditioned the right of individuals with mental disabilities to
receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate on an ex-
panded explanation of the reasonable-modifications regulation. "6 The
Court's attempt to clarify the concept of fundamental alteration gives
the states too much leeway in arguing a fundamental alteration de-
fense."7 If, as the Supreme Court noted in Choate, the concept of
fundamental alteration should be a balancing of the right of the
individual to be placed in the community and the right of the state to
manage its mental health program, then the expanded explication of
fundamental alteration has tipped the balance in favor of the states."'
Hopefully, courts in the future will have the insight to hold states to a
strict standard when evaluating a fundamental alteration defense."
C. The Role of Congress in the Aftermath of Olmstead
Because the Supreme Court's opinion will likely lead to continued
litigation in the lower courts with inconsistent results, it is important
362 See id. at 2185.
365 See id. at 2188-90; see also supra notes 319-92 and accompanying text.
See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181,2190.
:i95 See supra notes 277-318 and accompanying text.
566 See supra notes 319-88 anti accompanying text.
"7 See id.
398 See 469 U.S. at 300.
999 See supra Imes 380-03 and accompanying text.
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for the United States Congress to take the initiative at this juncture. 4°°
Congress should enact new legislation that would create a mechanism
to encourage states to provide services in the most integrated setting
appropriate, thereby complying with the intent of the drafters of the
ADA. 4°' MiCASSA, the proposed bill supported by ADAPT and de-
scribed in Part II, has the potential .to develop into such legislation. 402
As indicated by the Court's focus on the overall cost to the states,
one of the major obstacles thwarting the extension of community
integration is the issue of cost. 4"3 Although the placement of individuals
with disabilities in the community rather than in institutions will ulti-
mately result in savings to the states, states remain concerned about
the short-term impact of providing community placement clue to fixed
overhead costs. 4°4 After the Court delivered its opinion, Tommy Olin-
stead, the Commissioner of the Department of Human Resources in
Georgia, commented that "it's a matter of financing. We either need
to get more money . . or we've got to close hospitals."40° Federal
financial assistance to the states for community placement would ease
the short-term financial burden on states and mitigate the effect of
cost in the debate over community placement: 106 MiCASSA proposes
financial incentives to the states to encourage systemic changes in their
programs and thus enables them to make the transition to a more
community-based mental health system:4°7 Increased financial assis-
tance will make it less likely that states will he able to hide behind a
defense of a fundamental alteration based on excessive costs. 4°8
Moreover, MiCASSA provides a number of suggestions as to how
states might use financial incentives to bring about real change in their
mental health systems.409 The proposed bill thus contains some of the
specifics that are absent from the Court's discussion of state plans.'"
For example, MiCASSA suggests that states conduct a needs assessment
'w° See supra notes 389-93 acct accompanying text.
401 See, e.g., MiCASSA, supra note 91, §§ 1-7.
402 See id.
400 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188-89; Brief of State Legislatures, supra note 357, at *4
(arguing that the ADA does not impose a "costly mandate on stale mental health programs");
Wood, supra note GO, at 501.
1" See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 79, at *21.
.' 1:173. Rankin, supra luxe 263, at F4 (quoting Tommy Olmstead, Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Human Resources).
' 106 See supra notes 60-61,326-46 and accompanying text.
107 See MiCASSA, 511PM note 91, § 4.
1" See, e.g., Brief of State Legislatures. supra note 357, at *5.
.'"See MiCASSA, supra note 91, §§ 4(c)(1)-(11).
410 Compile Nil CA.SSA, supra unite 91, § 4(c)(1)-(11), with Olmstead, 1 19 S. Ct. at 2189,
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to determine the number of individuals currently in institutions for
whom community placement is appropriate, the availability of commu-
nity-based settings to accommodate these individuals and the antici-
pated change in demand for home or community-based services. 411
Such an assessment would enable a state to set up a specific timetable
for the provision of community placement for individuals with disabili-
ties.412 In addition, a state could utilize the incentives to develop and
implement strategies to change current state policies and procedures
that perpetuate an institutional bias in the state's mental health sys-
tem . 4
 " Alternatively, states could use the financial assistance to initiate
training for professionals or para-professionals, alleviate fixed costs as
individuals move out of institutions or help with other transitional
costs.414 By allowing the states to decide how funding would best assist
their programs, MiCASSA gives states flexibility in the management of
their complex mental health programs, an issue deemed important by
the Supreme Court:115
 At the same time, by encouraging the states to
adopt some of these procedures, MiCASSA would help the states move
in the direction of a more community-based mental health system. 416
MiCASSA additionally specifies that a state must maintain a quality
assurance program, including an external system for the monitoring
of services by the individuals with disabilities, their family members,
disability organizations and members of the community: 117 The states
must also establish a procedure for appealing denials of eligibility and
reporting grievances, as well as a process for filing complaints about
abuse and neglect.4113 Moreover, MiCASSA proposes that the Secretary
of HHS conduct periodic reviews of the progress of the individuals that
the state serves. 419 Given the states' flexibility and autonomy in the
design and implementation of their mental health programs, it is
crucial that there be a system for the independent monitoring of state
compliance with their plans. 42° There is nothing in the Court's opinion
to ensure follow-through on the part of the states. 42 I
411 See MiCASSA, supra note 91, § 4(c) (1).
112 See id. § 4(a)(1).
113 See id. § 4(c) (2).
414 See id. § 4(c) (5), (7), (8).
415 See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2189 (holding that states need sufficient leeway to maintain a
range of services).
416 See MiC.ASSA, supra note 91, § 2(b).




121 See 119 S. Ct. at 2189.
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Furthermore, MiCASSA provides methods for involving the indi-
vidual with disabilities in the decision-making process regarding place-
ment.422 Although the Supreme Court's opinion stated that an individ-
ual with disabilities must not oppose community placement, the Court
failed to indicate how important it is for individuals with disabilities to
receive adequate information in order to make infohned decisions.'"
The role of the individual in the decision-making process concerning
community placement is central to MiCASSA, which specifies that the
individual must have suffiCient information to be able to make "real
choices" concerning services that meet his or her needs in the most
integrated setting approptiate. 42" The prospective bill also states that
neither federal nor state policies should impede an individual's
choice.425 Thus, a bill such as MiCASSA will help fill in the gaps that
remain after the Supreme Court's ruling in Olmstead:12"
CONCLUSION
It is highly significant that in its recent ruling in Olmstead, the
Supreme Court clearly stated that unjustified segregation in institu-
tions constitutes discrimination under the ADA. This statement holds
out great promise for the future for individuals with mental disabilities.
Unfortunately, in another part of its ruling, the Court conditioned the
right of individuals with mental disabilities to live in the most inte-
grated setting appropriate on an expanded explanation of the reason-
able-modifications regulation. By giving the states too much leeway and
by virtually providing the states with a road-map of how to argue the
fundamental alteration defense, the Court has created a potentially
serious obstacle to the goal of community integration. Hopefully,
courts in the future will hold states to a strict standard when evaluating
a fundamental alteration defense. As a result of the increased litigation
that will likely occur, Congress should enact legislation, such as Mi-
CASSA, to enable individuals with disabilities to enjoy the benefits of
life outside an institution, a life enriched by friendships and a multi-
tude of experiences. The issue of community integration is a prime
422 See, e.g., MiCASSA, supra note 91, § 2(1)(2) (specifying that each state should develop ''a
comprehensive consumer-responsive statewide s±„ ,stent that provides real consumer choice and
direction ....").
423 See supra notes 299-311 and accompanying text. The federal statutory requirements
tinder the 1IC1IS Waiver Program also emphasize the importance of individuals receiving ade-
quate information. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
421 See MiCASSA, supra note 91, § 2(c) (1).
425 See hl. § 2(e) (3).
426 See hi. §§ 1-7.
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concern in the disability rights community. What is needed now is a
rekindling and a re-energizing of interest on the part of the general
population. It has been almost a decade since the passage of the ADA;
it is time for Congress to act again. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Olmstead should serve as a catalyst, providing momentum to Congress
to forge ahead with new legislation for the millennium.
JOANNE KARGER
